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| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Simulation hypothesis | 1/6 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation_hypothesis | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T07:10:30.034179+00:00 | kb-cron |
The simulation hypothesis proposes that what one experiences as the real world is actually a simulated reality, such as a computer simulation in which humans are constructs. There has been much debate over this topic in the philosophical discourse. Precursors include Zhuangzi's "Butterfly Dream" and René Descartes's "evil demon". In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom proposed the simulation argument suggesting that if a civilization becomes capable of creating conscious simulations, it could generate so many simulated beings that a randomly chosen conscious entity would almost certainly be in a simulation. This argument presents a trilemma:
either such simulations are not created because of technological limitations or self-destruction; advanced civilizations choose not to create them; if advanced civilizations do create them, the number of simulations would far exceed base reality and we would therefore almost certainly be living in one. This assumes that consciousness is not uniquely tied to biological brains but can arise from any system that implements the right computational structures and processes. Variations on the idea have also been featured in science fiction, appearing as a central plot device in many stories and films, such as Simulacron-3 (1964) and The Matrix (1999).
== Origins == Human history is full of thinkers who observed the difference between how things seem and how they might actually be, with dreams, illusions, and hallucinations providing poetic and philosophical metaphors. For example, the "Butterfly Dream" of Zhuangzi from ancient China, or the Indian philosophy of Maya, or in ancient Greek philosophy, where Anaxarchus and Monimus likened existing things to a scene-painting and supposed them to resemble the impressions experienced in sleep or madness. Aztec philosophical texts theorized that the world was a painting or book written by the Teotl. A common theme in the spiritual philosophy of the religious movements collectively referred to by scholars as Gnosticism was the belief that reality as we experience it is the creation of a lesser, possibly malevolent, deity, from which humanity should seek to escape. In the Western philosophical tradition, Plato's allegory of the cave analogized human beings to chained prisoners unable to see reality. René Descartes' evil demon philosophically formalized these epistemic doubts, to be followed by a large literature with subsequent variations like brain in a vat. In 1969, Konrad Zuse published his book Calculating Space on automata theory, in which he proposed the idea that the universe was fundamentally computational, a concept which became known as digital physics. Later, roboticist Hans Moravec explored related themes through the lens of artificial intelligence, discussing concepts like mind uploading and speculating that our current reality might itself be a computer simulation created by future intelligences.
== Simulation argument ==
Nick Bostrom's premise:
Many works of science fiction as well as some forecasts by serious technologists and futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. One thing that later generations might do with their super-powerful computers is run detailed simulations of their forebears or of people like their forebears. Because their computers would be so powerful, they could run a great many such simulations. Suppose that these simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct). Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an original race. Bostrom's conclusion:
It is then possible to argue that, if this were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones. Therefore, if we don't think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believe that we will have descendants who will run lots of such simulations of their forebears.
=== Expanded argument === In 2003, Bostrom proposed a trilemma that he called "the simulation argument". Despite its name, the "simulation argument" does not directly argue that humans live in a simulation; instead, it argues that one of three unlikely-seeming propositions is almost certainly true: