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| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bureaucratic drift | 1/2 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureaucratic_drift | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T15:50:15.008801+00:00 | kb-cron |
In American political science, bureaucratic drift is a theory that seeks to explain the tendency for bureaucratic agencies to create policy that deviates from the original mandate. The difference between a bureaucracy's enactment of a law and the legislature's intent is called bureaucratic drift. Legislation is produced by elected officials, but is implemented by unelected bureaucrats, who sometimes act under their own preferences or interests. Bureaucratic drift is often treated as a principal–agent problem, with Congress and the Presidency acting as principals and bureaucracy acting as the agent. The government seeks to control bureaucratic drift in a number of ways, most notably congressional oversight and procedural controls.
== History == Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast first defined the theory of bureaucratic drift in 1987. They argued that drift is essentially a principal-agent problem that explores "how—or indeed, whether—elected political officials can reasonably effectively assure that their policy intentions will be carried out." The major tenets of the theory include how bureaucrats can manipulate policy when creating bureaucratic agencies and the argument that delay built into the bureaucracy is a good thing, because delay gives government a chance to perfect a policy over time. In 1989, Murray Horn and Kenneth Shepsle proposed that coalitional drift, the phenomenon of present legislation being overwritten by the changing views of political coalitions, is a trade-off to bureaucratic drift. The relationship between bureaucratic and coalitional drift is a disputed part of the bureaucratic drift theory. In 1992, Jonathan Macey hypothesized that the creation of an agency's structure and design is instrumental in preventing bureaucratic drift. Macey speculates that both current interest groups and Congress benefit from the careful structure and design of a bureaucratic agency. The former is pleased by policies that continue to reflect their preferences while the latter is pleased that both bureaucratic and coalitional drift are protected against. Contrary to Horn and Shepsle, Macey argues that coalitional drift and bureaucratic drift aren't necessarily opposing forces, but that the careful construction of an agency's structure and design can mitigate the costs of both types of drift. He also disagrees with McCubbins, Noll and Weingast on the power of delay to reduce bureaucratic drift, because extra time gives future interest groups and a future Congress the opportunity to insert their own preferences into the proposed policy. This is an example of coalitional and bureaucratic drift working counter to each other.
== Causes == Scholars have identified three major areas that contribute to bureaucratic drift: how bureaucracies are structured, interest groups that lobby bureaucracies, and presidential appointments of bureaucratic leaders.
=== Structural === Bureaucratic agencies are often structured so that legislators and their staffers have the opportunity to easily monitor bureaucratic activity. While some scholars believe that structural organization can help lessen bureaucratic drift, other scholars have found that this approach can backfire. When a bureaucracy is permeable anyone can access it, including legislators who were originally adverse to the legislation being implemented. Further, scholars argue that if a bureaucratic agency is designed to represent a single interest, its implementations are more likely to reflect the views of the people they are representing than they are the views of the legislature.
=== Lobbying === Making bureaucracies easily accessible means that interest groups can have a greater influence on the outcome of policy implementation. Some scholars believe that bureaucracies can have positive interactions with interest groups. An example of such an interaction is when interest groups support bureaucracies by providing information and facts about areas the bureaucracy is meant to promote or serve. Other scholars, however, have found that interest groups can cause bureaucratic drift. When a bureaucratic agency is infiltrated or corrupted by an external group whose views do not align with the preferences of the legislature it is said that the bureaucratic agency is captured. If an interest group negotiates with a bureaucracy, it can bias the bureaucracy to implement policy that drifts from the original intention of the legislation so the policy instead better serves the needs of the interest group.
=== Presidential appointments === Scholars consider presidents active in the affairs of "independent" bureaucracies. Presidential nominations are sometimes considered a check on bureaucracies because it ensures reliable agent performance. However, presidents can use appointments for political gain. A president may wish to maintain bureaucratic drift if it lies in his or her favor. An administrative agency can be captured by a president when he or she appoints a bureaucratic head that reaffirms bureaucratic drift that is favorable to the president's policies. In cases where bureaucratic drift is present, scholars believe that the president can change policy more rapidly than in a zero-drift scenario.
== Checks ==