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| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evidentialism | 2/2 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evidentialism | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T09:56:05.345615+00:00 | kb-cron |
Foundationalism: There exist beliefs that are justified, but not because they are based on any other beliefs. These are called properly basic beliefs, and they are the foundation upon which all other justified beliefs ultimately rest. Coherentism: Justified beliefs are all evidentially supported by other beliefs, but an infinite set of beliefs is not generated, because the chains of evidential support among beliefs is allowed to move in a circle. On the resulting picture, a person's belief is justified when it fits together with the person's other beliefs in a coherent way in which the person's various beliefs mutually support one another. A modest reasoner subset of Coherentism would insist that all justifiable beliefs be statements about "some objects" since the negation/complement of a some statement is another some statement. Skepticism: There cannot be any justified beliefs. A modest reasoner subset of Scepticism like the subset of Coherentism would likewise insist and define all justifiable beliefs be statements about "some objects" since the negation/complement of a some statement is another some statement. Infinitism: Aside from these responses, some philosophers have said that evidential chains terminate in beliefs that are not justified. Others have said that, indeed, there can exist infinite chains of reasons. Of the main responses, coherentism and skepticism are clearly consistent with evidentialism. Coherentism allows evidential support for all of our justified beliefs in the face of the regress argument by allowing for circular chains of evidential support among beliefs. And the skeptic here is utilizing an evidentialist demand to arrive at her skeptical conclusion. But because the resulting skepticism is so sweeping and devastating, and because so many reject the legitimacy of the circular reasoning embraced by the coherentist, foundationalism is the favored response of many philosophers to the regress argument. And foundationalism does not so clearly fit together with evidentialism. At first glance, at least, the "basic" beliefs of the foundationalist would appear to be counterexamples to the evidentialist's thesis, in that they are justified beliefs that are not rational because they are not supported by deeper evidence.
== Non-evidentialist theories of knowledge and justification == Many contemporary epistemologists reject the view that evidential support is the whole story about the justification of beliefs. While no sensible epistemologists generally urge people to disregard their evidence when forming beliefs, many believe that a more complete theory would introduce considerations about the processes that initiate and sustain beliefs. An example of one such theory is reliabilism. The most influential proponent of reliabilism is Alvin Goldman. According to a crude form of reliabilism, S is justified in believing p if and only if S's belief in p is caused by a reliable process—a process that generally leads to true beliefs. Some of these reliable processes may require the processing of evidence; many others won't. So, Goldman would argue, evidentialism, on which the justification of a belief always turns completely on the issue of the belief's evidential support, is false. Likewise, evidentialism will be rejected by more sophisticated versions of reliabilism, some of which will allow evidence an important but limited role, as opposed to the all-encompassing role assigned to it by evidentialism. Other non-evidentialist theories include: the causal theory, according to which S knows p if and only if S's belief in p is causally connected in an appropriate way with S's believing p; and Robert Nozick's truth tracking theory, according to which S knows p if and only if (i) p is true, (ii) S believes p, (iii) S's attitude toward p tracks the truth value of p in that, when p is not true, S does not believe p and when p is true, S does believe p. Another alternative perspective, promoted by David Hume's 18th-century opponent, Presbyterian philosopher Thomas Reid, and perhaps hinted at by Hume himself, at least in some moods (though this is a very controversial issue in interpreting Hume), has it that some of our "natural" beliefs—beliefs we are led to form by natural features of the human constitution—have what can be called an "innocent-until-proven-guilty" status. Contrary to evidentialism, they can be justified in the absence of any effective evidence that supports them. They are justified just so long as one doesn't have good reason to think them false. A new account of the extent of our evidence is Timothy Williamson's claim that E=K: one's evidence is what one knows. Going by the "letter of the law," Williamson's resulting theory is not contrary to, but is rather an instance of, evidentialism. By allowing our evidence to encompass everything we know, Williamson is able to give thoroughly evidentialist accounts of many important epistemological concepts. But, traditionally, evidentialists have presupposed much more restrictive accounts of what our evidence is. Thus, Williamson's theory is opposed to the spirit of much traditional evidentialism, primarily because it turns evidentialism from an internalist account of justification to an externalist account (due to the factive nature of knowledge.) However, Williamson's work may point to a quite general way to modify traditional evidentialism to make it better able to meet the challenges it faces: whether or not one goes so far as to accept that E=K, broadening one's view of what constitutes our evidence may provide a way to address many of the objections to evidentialism, especially to those disinclined to swallow skeptical consequences of a view
== Notes ==
== References == Conee; Feldman (2004), Evidentialism, Oxford University Press.
== External links == Fieser, James; Dowden, Bradley (eds.). "Evidentialism". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 2161-0002. OCLC 37741658. by Dan Mittag of the University of Rochester Kelly, Thomas. "Evidence". In Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ISSN 1095-5054. OCLC 429049174. Evidentialism at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project Evidentialism at PhilPapers