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| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bureaucratic drift | 2/2 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bureaucratic_drift | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T15:50:15.008801+00:00 | kb-cron |
=== Legislative checks === Through congressional acts, the legislative branch has the power to curb bureaucratic drift. Such regulation can take the form of statutory control or congressional oversight. Through statutory control, Congress aims to limit bureaucratic drift before it occurs by exerting influence over the organization of a bureaucracy. Congress exerts statutory control by specifying the bureaucracy's agenda, structure, time and fiscal constraints, and procedures while leaving little discretion to the bureaucracies. Oversight, on the other hand, occurs when Congress monitors the actions of bureaucracies and is used to check bureaucratic drift after agencies have acted on policies. Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz have categorized oversight into two types- police patrol and fire alarm patrol. Police patrol refers to oversight when legislators instigate investigations into bureaucracies and actively search for bureaucratic drift. Such oversight may involve legislators monitoring agencies, reading reports, conducting field studies, and questioning officials. Unlike police patrol, Congress also uses fire-alarm patrol by constructing procedures that allow citizens and interest groups to alert legislators of drift. This method involves less action by congress, and McCubbins and Schwartz argue that it is preferred by legislators as it allows them to devote less time and resources to oversight. However, other scholars criticize fire-alarm patrol by arguing that citizens' complaints may never reach legislators and those that do may be deceitful, thus sounding "false alarms".
=== Judicial checks === Because of the Administrative Procedure Act, the judicial branch is able to check bureaucratic drift through judicial review. Scholars have argued that the judicial branch checks bureaucratic drift most efficiently when controlling delays of implementing law. Timing is important because the process gives less organized groups time to learn about proposed actions and respond to these proposals. The same scholars point out that ongoing delays caused by judicial review on agency actions may discourage less organized interest, because such groups lack the resources necessary to maintain an effective coalition over long periods of time. Other scholars argue that judicial review also allows less organized groups to hire lawyers to assist in monitoring agency actions.
=== Executive checks === The president has the power to check bureaucratic drift through executive orders and by choosing appointees for the highest post of bureaucracies. A president can attempt to affect drift by choosing appointees whose preferences closely resemble his or her own. Also cabinet officials have their own independent evaluation staffs in charge of ensuring that agencies do not drift from government decisions. Monitoring bureaucratic agencies is also possible through the Office of Management and Budget as well as the White House staff. Since Congress controls the amount of money appropriated to bureaucratic agencies, monitoring by the Office of Management and Budget is limited. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, a division of the Office of Management and Budget, can delay agency regulations it deems unsatisfactory. Scholars argue that one problem of the executive branch working to reduce bureaucratic drift is that it wastes time and resources that could be spent serving constituents. Also other scholars point out that future coalitions may tamper with carefully negotiated bargains. Therefore executives often focus more on work they can immediately benefit from.
== Implications == While some scholars believe that delegation is a necessary part of the American government, and that bureaucratic drift is a risk that must be weighed when delegating implementation powers, others believe that delegation of power to bureaucracy is both unconstitutional and happens too frequently. These scholars subscribe to the Non-delegation Doctrine, and believe that the risk posed by bureaucratic drift is disruptive enough to American politics that delegation must be reconsidered or even eliminated.
== References ==
== Further reading == Benson, J. Kenneth (1973). "The Analysis of Bureaucratic-Professional Conflict: Functional versus Dialectical Approaches". The Sociological Quarterly. 14 (3): 376–94. doi:10.1111/j.1533-8525.1973.tb00867.x. JSTOR 4105685. Gailmard, Sean; Patty, John W. (2007). "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise". American Journal of Political Science. 51 (4): 873–89. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00286.x. JSTOR 4620105. Meier, Kenneth J.; John Bohte (2006). Politics and the Bureaucracy (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Reenock, Christopher; Poggione, Sarah (2004). "Agency Design as an Ongoing Tool of Bureaucratic Influence". Legislative Studies Quarterly. 29 (3): 383–406. doi:10.3162/036298004x201221. JSTOR 3598559. West, William F (1997). "Searching for a Theory of Bureaucratic Structure". Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 7 (4): 591–613. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.631.4267. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024367. JSTOR 1181661. Wilson, James Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 9780465007844.