5.8 KiB
| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V-2 rocket | 7/10 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V-2_rocket | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T13:12:26.817016+00:00 | kb-cron |
=== Direct attack and disinformation === The only effective defences against the V-2 campaign were to destroy the launch infrastructure—expensive in terms of bomber resources and casualties—or to cause the Germans to aim at the wrong place by disinformation. The British were able to convince the Germans to direct V-1s and V-2s aimed at London to less populated areas east of the city. This was done by sending deceptive reports on the sites hit and damage caused via the German espionage network in Britain, which was secretly controlled by the British (the Double-Cross System). According to the BBC television presenter Raymond Baxter, who served with the RAF during the war, in February 1945 his squadron was performing a mission against a V2 launch site, when they saw one missile being launched. One member of Baxter's squadron opened fire on it, without effect. On 3 March 1945, the Allies attempted to destroy V-2s and launching equipment in the "Haagse Bos" in The Hague by a large-scale bombardment, but due to navigational errors the Bezuidenhout quarter was destroyed, killing 511 Dutch civilians.
== Assessment == The German V-weapons (V-1 and V-2) cost, as a conservative estimate, around 2 billion ℛ︁ℳ︁ the equivalent of about 500 million wartime US dollars. Given the relatively smaller size of the German economy, this represented an industrial effort equivalent to but slightly less than that of the U.S. Manhattan Project that produced the atomic bomb. Approximately 6000 V-2s were built, for which the Reich paid 450 million ℛ︁ℳ︁, equating to a unit cost of around 80,000 ℛ︁ℳ︁. However, this excluded the cost of the warhead, guidance system, and needed infrastructure. Around 3200 were launched. SS General Hans Kammler, who as an engineer had constructed several concentration camps including Auschwitz, had a reputation for brutality and had originated the idea of using concentration camp prisoners as slave laborers for the rocket program. More people died manufacturing the V-2 than were killed by its deployment.
The V-2 consumed a third of Germany's fuel alcohol production and major portions of other critical technologies. Due to a lack of explosives, some warheads were simply filled with concrete, using the kinetic energy alone for destruction, and sometimes the warhead contained photographic propaganda of German citizens who had died in Allied bombings. The psychological effect of the V-2 is disputed. The V-2, traveling faster than the speed of sound, gave no warning before impact (unlike bombing planes or the V-1 flying bomb, which made a characteristic buzzing sound). There was no effective defence and no risk of pilot or crew casualties. An example of the impression it made is in the reaction of American pilot and future nuclear strategist and Congressional aide William Liscum Borden, who in November 1944 while returning from a nighttime air mission over Holland saw a V-2 in flight on its way to strike London: "It resembled a meteor, streaming red sparks and whizzing past us as though the aircraft were motionless. I became convinced that it was only a matter of time until rockets would expose the United States to direct, transoceanic attack." However, historian Michael J. Neufeld writes that the missile was "unimpressive", arguing that the lack of noise meant it created less terror than the V-1, and the lack of effective defences means that the Allies expended much fewer resources in trying to counter it. Outside of a few areas most targeted for attacks, the missile was "little more than a nuisance". With the war all but lost, regardless of the factory output of conventional weapons, the Nazis resorted to V-weapons as a tenuous last hope to influence the war militarily (hence Antwerp as V-2 target), as an extension of their desire to "punish" their foes and most importantly to give hope to their sympathizers with their miracle weapon. A post-war analysis by the British War Office was scathing: the V-2 specification "was conceived not for the carrying out of any deeply laid strategic plan for the bombardment of England or any other country, or indeed with any clearly defined application in view. It was merely conceived as a 'super gun', which would impress those in the highest places". The V-2 did not affect the outcome of the war, but it resulted in the development of the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the Cold War, which were also used for space exploration.
== Unfulfilled plans == A submarine-towed launch platform was tested successfully, making it the prototype for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The project codename was Prüfstand XII ("Test stand XII"), sometimes termed the rocket U-boat. If deployed, it would have allowed a U-boat to launch V-2 missiles against United States cities, though only with considerable effort (and limited effect). Hitler, in July 1944, and Speer, in January 1945, made speeches alluding to the scheme, though Germany did not possess the capability to fulfill these threats. While interned after the war by the British at CSDIC camp 11, Dornberger was recorded saying that he had begged the Führer to stop the V-weapon propaganda, because nothing more could be expected from one ton of explosive. To this Hitler had replied that Dornberger might not expect more, but he (Hitler) certainly did. According to decrypted messages from the Japanese embassy in Germany, twelve dismantled V-2 rockets were shipped to Japan. These left Bordeaux in August 1944 on the transport U-boats U-219 and U-195, which reached Jakarta in December 1944. A civilian V-2 expert was a passenger on U-234, bound for Japan in May 1945 when the war ended in Europe. The fate of these V-2 rockets is unknown.
== Post-war use ==