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| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cognitive miser | 3/3 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_miser | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T14:56:34.239494+00:00 | kb-cron |
=== Risk assessment === The metaphor of cognitive misers could assist people in drawing lessons from risks, which is the possibility that an undesirable state of reality may occur. People apply a number of shortcuts or heuristics in making judgements about the likelihood of an event, because the rapid answers provided by heuristics are often right. Yet certain pitfalls may be neglected in these shortcuts. A practical example of the cognitively miserly way of thinking in the context of a risk assessment of Deepwater Horizon explosion, is presented below.
People have trouble in imagining how small failings can pile up to form a catastrophe; People tend to get accustomed to risk. Due to the seemingly smooth current situation, people unconsciously adjust their acceptance of risk; People tend to over-express their faith and confidence in backup systems and safety devices; People regard complicated technical systems in line with complicated governing structures; When concerned with a certain issue, people tend to spread good news and hide bad news; People tend to think alike if they are in the same field (see also: echo chamber), regardless of their position in a project's hierarchy.
=== Psychology === The theory that human beings are cognitive misers, also shed light on the dual process theory in psychology. Dual process theory proposes that there are two types of cognitive processes in human mind. Daniel Kahneman described these as intuitive (System 1) and reasoning (System 2), respectively. When processing with System 1, which starts automatically and without control, people expend little to no effort, but can generate complex patterns of ideas. When processing with System 2, people actively consider how best to distribute mental effort to accurately process data, and can construct thoughts in an orderly series of steps. These two cognitive processing systems are not separate and can have interactions with each other. Here is an example of how people's beliefs are formed under the dual process model:
The reasoning process can be activated to help with the intuition when:
A question arises, but System 1 does not generate an answer An event is detected to violate the model of world that System 1 maintains. Conflicts also exists in this dual-process. A brief example provided by Kahneman is that when we try not to stare at the oddly dressed couple at the neighboring table in a restaurant, our automatic reaction (System 1) makes us stare at them, but conflicts emerge as System 2 tries to control this behavior. The dual processing system can produce cognitive illusions. System 1 always operates automatically, with our easiest shortcut but often with error. System 2 may also have no clue to the error. Errors can be prevented only by enhanced monitoring of System 2, which costs a plethora of cognitive efforts.
== Limitations ==
=== Omission of motivation === The cognitive miser theory did not originally specify the role of motivation. In Fiske's subsequent research, the omission of the role of intent in the metaphor of cognitive miser is recognized. Motivation does affect the activation and use of stereotypes and prejudices.
== Updates and later research ==
=== Motivated tactician === People tend to use heuristic shortcuts when making decisions. But the problem remains that, although these shortcuts could not compare to effortful thoughts in accuracy, people should have a certain parameter to help them adopt one of the most adequate shortcuts. Kruglanski proposed that people are combination of naïve scientists and cognitive misers: people are flexible social thinkers who choose between multiple cognitive strategies (i.e., speed/ease vs. accuracy/logic) based on their current goals, motives, and needs. Later models suggest that the cognitive miser and the naïve scientist create two poles of social cognition that are too monolithic. Instead, Fiske, Taylor, and Arie W. Kruglanski and other social psychologists offer an alternative explanation of social cognition: the motivated tactician. According to this theory, people employ either shortcuts or thoughtful analysis based upon the context and salience of a particular issue. In other words, this theory suggests that humans are, in fact, both naive scientists and cognitive misers. In this sense people are strategic instead of passively choosing the most effortless shortcuts when they allocate their cognitive efforts, and therefore they can decide to be naïve scientists or cognitive misers depending on their goals.
== See also ==
Bounded rationality Low-information voter Motivated reasoning Representativeness heuristic Path of least resistance
== References ==
== Further reading == Barr, Nathaniel; Pennycook, Gordon; Stolz, Jennifer A.; Fugelsang, Jonathan A. (July 2015). "The brain in your pocket: evidence that smartphones are used to supplant thinking". Computers in Human Behavior. 48: 473–480. doi:10.1016/j.chb.2015.02.029. De Neys, Wim; Rossi, Sandrine; Houdé, Olivier (April 2013). "Bats, balls, and substitution sensitivity: cognitive misers are no happy fools". Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 20 (2): 269–273. doi:10.3758/s13423-013-0384-5. PMID 23417270. Stanovich, Keith E. (2011). "The cognitive miser and focal bias". Rationality and the reflective mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 65–71. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341140.003.0004. ISBN 9780195341140. OCLC 648932780.