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| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Collective action problem | 2/6 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_action_problem | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T07:13:10.731395+00:00 | kb-cron |
The prisoner's dilemma model, one of the most famous examples in game theory, is crucial to understanding the collective problem because it illustrates the consequences of individual interests that conflict with the interests of the group. In simple models such as this one, the problem would have been solved had the two prisoners been able to communicate. In more complex real world situations involving numerous individuals, however, the collective action problem often prevents groups from making decisions that are of collective economic interest. The prisoner's dilemma is a simple game that serves as the basis for research on social dilemmas. The premise of the game is that two partners in crime are imprisoned separately and each are offered leniency if they provide evidence against the other. As seen in the table below, the optimal individual outcome is to testify against the other without being testified against. However, the optimal group outcome is for the two prisoners to cooperate with each other.
In iterated games, players may learn to trust one another, or develop strategies like tit-for-tat, cooperating unless the opponent has defected in the previous round. Asymmetric prisoner's dilemma games are those in which one prisoner has more to gain and/or lose than the other. In iterated experiments with unequal rewards for co-operation, a goal of maximizing benefit may be overruled by a goal of equalizing benefit. The disadvantaged player may defect a certain proportion of the time without it being in the interest of the advantaged player to defect. In more natural circumstances, there may be better solutions to the bargaining problem. Related games include the Snowdrift game, Stag hunt, the Unscrupulous diner's dilemma, and the Centipede game.
=== Evolutionary theories === Biological and evolutionary approaches provide useful complementary insights into decision-making in social dilemmas. According to selfish gene theory, individuals may pursue a seemingly irrational strategy to cooperate if it benefits the survival of their genes. The concept of inclusive fitness delineates that cooperating with family members might pay because of shared genetic interests. It might be profitable for a parent to help their off-spring because doing so facilitates the survival of their genes. Reciprocity theories provide a different account of the evolution of cooperation. In repeated social dilemma games between the same individuals, cooperation might emerge because participants can punish a partner for failing to cooperate. This encourages reciprocal cooperation. Reciprocity serves as an explanation for why participants cooperate in dyads, but fails to account for larger groups. Evolutionary theories of indirect reciprocity and costly signaling may be useful to explain large-scale cooperation. When people can selectively choose partners to play games with, it pays to develop a cooperative reputation. Cooperation communicates kindness and generosity, which combine to make someone an attractive group member.
=== Psychological theories === Psychological models offer additional insights into social dilemmas by questioning the traditional game theory assumption that individuals are confined to their narrow self-interest. Interdependence Theory suggests that people transform a given pay-off matrix into an effective matrix that is more consistent with their social dilemma preferences. A prisoner's dilemma with close kin, for example, changes the pay-off matrix into one in which it is rational to be cooperative. Attribution models offer further support for these transformations. Whether individuals approach a social dilemma selfishly or cooperatively might depend upon whether they believe people are naturally greedy or cooperative. Similarly, goal-expectation theory assumes that people might cooperate under two conditions: They must (1) have a cooperative goal, and (2) expect others to cooperate. Another psychological model, the appropriateness model, questions the game theory assumption that individuals rationally calculate their pay-offs. Instead many people base their decisions on what people around them do and use simple heuristics, like an equality rule, to decide whether or not to cooperate. The logic of appropriateness suggests that people ask themselves the question: "what does a person like me (identity) do (rules/heuristics) in a situation like this (recognition) given this culture (group)?" (Weber et al., 2004) (Kopelman 2009) and that these factors influence cooperation.
== Public goods ==