6.2 KiB
| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scientific method | 6/13 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T06:27:02.337150+00:00 | kb-cron |
=== Empiricism, rationalism, and more pragmatic views === Scientific endeavour can be characterised as the pursuit of truths about the natural world or as the elimination of doubt about the same. The former is the direct construction of explanations from empirical data and logic, the latter the reduction of potential explanations. It was established above how the interpretation of empirical data is theory-laden, so neither approach is trivial. The ubiquitous element in the scientific method is empiricism, which holds that knowledge is created by a process involving observation; scientific theories generalize observations. This is in opposition to stringent forms of rationalism, which holds that knowledge is created by the human intellect; later clarified by Popper to be built on prior theory. The scientific method embodies the position that reason alone cannot solve a particular scientific problem; it unequivocally refutes claims that revelation, political or religious dogma, appeals to tradition, commonly held beliefs, common sense, or currently held theories pose the only possible means of demonstrating truth. In 1877, C. S. Peirce characterized inquiry in general not as the pursuit of truth per se but as the struggle to move from irritating, inhibitory doubts born of surprises, disagreements, and the like, and to reach a secure belief, the belief being that on which one is prepared to act. His pragmatic views framed scientific inquiry as part of a broader spectrum and as spurred, like inquiry generally, by actual doubt, not mere verbal or "hyperbolic doubt", which he held to be fruitless. This "hyperbolic doubt" Peirce argues against here is of course just another name for Cartesian doubt associated with René Descartes. It is a methodological route to certain knowledge by identifying what can't be doubted. A strong formulation of the scientific method is not always aligned with a form of empiricism in which the empirical data is put forward in the form of experience or other abstracted forms of knowledge as in current scientific practice the use of scientific modelling and reliance on abstract typologies and theories is normally accepted. In 2010, Hawking suggested that physics' models of reality should simply be accepted where they prove to make useful predictions. He calls the concept model-dependent realism.
== Rationality == The following section will first explore beliefs and biases, and then get to the rational reasoning most associated with the sciences.
=== Beliefs and biases ===
Scientific methodology often directs that hypotheses be tested in controlled conditions wherever possible. This is frequently possible in certain areas, such as in the biological sciences, and more difficult in other areas, such as in astronomy. The practice of experimental control and reproducibility can have the effect of diminishing the potentially harmful effects of circumstance, and to a degree, personal bias. For example, pre-existing beliefs can alter the interpretation of results, as in confirmation bias; this is a heuristic that leads a person with a particular belief to see things as reinforcing their belief, even if another observer might disagree (in other words, people tend to observe what they expect to observe).
[T]he action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained. A historical example is the belief that the legs of a galloping horse are splayed at the point when none of the horse's legs touch the ground, to the point of this image being included in paintings by its supporters. However, the first stop-action pictures of a horse's gallop by Eadweard Muybridge showed this to be false, and that the legs are instead gathered together. Another important human bias that plays a role is a preference for new, surprising statements (see Appeal to novelty), which can result in a search for evidence that the new is true. Poorly attested beliefs can be believed and acted upon via a less rigorous heuristic. Goldhaber and Nieto published in 2010 the observation that if theoretical structures with "many closely neighboring subjects are described by connecting theoretical concepts, then the theoretical structure acquires a robustness which makes it increasingly hard – though certainly never impossible – to overturn". When a narrative is constructed its elements become easier to believe. Fleck (1979), p. 27 notes "Words and ideas are originally phonetic and mental equivalences of the experiences coinciding with them. ... Such proto-ideas are at first always too broad and insufficiently specialized. ... Once a structurally complete and closed system of opinions consisting of many details and relations has been formed, it offers enduring resistance to anything that contradicts it". Sometimes, these relations have their elements assumed a priori, or contain some other logical or methodological flaw in the process that ultimately produced them. Donald M. MacKay has analyzed these elements in terms of limits to the accuracy of measurement and has related them to instrumental elements in a category of measurement.
=== Deductive and inductive reasoning ===
The idea of there being two opposed justifications for truth has shown up throughout the history of scientific method as analysis versus synthesis, non-ampliative/ampliative, or even confirmation and verification. (And there are other kinds of reasoning.) One to use what is observed to build towards fundamental truths – and the other to derive from those fundamental truths more specific principles. Deductive reasoning derives specific conclusions from established general principles—if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Inductive reasoning builds general principles from observations—conclusions are probable but not guaranteed. Scientific inquiry employs both: induction generates hypotheses from observations; deduction predicts testable consequences. This process requires stringent scepticism regarding observed phenomena, because cognitive assumptions can distort the interpretation of initial perceptions.