5.5 KiB
| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abdul Qadeer Khan | 6/9 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T17:40:01.271952+00:00 | kb-cron |
The innovation and improved designs of centrifuges were marked as classified for export restriction by the Pakistan government, though Khan was still in possession of earlier designs of centrifuges from when he worked for URENCO in the 1970s. In 1990, the United States alleged that highly sensitive information was being exported to North Korea in exchange for rocket engines. Pakistan's Ghauri missile was based entirely on North Korea's Rodong-1 as reflected in its technology. The project was supported by Benazir Bhutto who consulted for the project with North Korea and facilitated the technology transfer to Khan Research Laboratories in 1993. On multiple occasions, Khan levelled accusations against Benazir Bhutto's administration of providing secret enrichment information, on a compact disc (CD), to North Korea; these accusations were denied by Benazir Bhutto's staff and military personnel. Between 1987 and 1989, Khan secretly leaked knowledge of centrifuges to Iran without notifying the Pakistan Government, although this issue is a subject of political controversy. In 2003, the European Union pressured Iran to accept tougher inspections of its nuclear program and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed an enrichment facility in the city of Natanz, Iran, utilising gas centrifuges based on the designs and methods used by URENCO. The IAEA inspectors quickly identified the centrifuges as P-1 types, which had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1989", and the Iranian negotiators turned over the names of their suppliers, which identified Khan as one of them. Heinz Mebus, a German engineer and businessman and college friend of Khan, was named as one of the suppliers - acting as a middleman for Khan. In May 1998, Newsweek reported that Khan had sent Iraq centrifuge designs, which were apparently confiscated by the UNMOVIC officials. Iraqi officials said "the documents were authentic but that they had not agreed to work with A. Q. Khan, fearing an ISI sting operation, due to strained relations between two countries. On 7 June 1998, 10 days after Pakistan's first underground nuclear test, there was yet another incident according to Foreign Policy. Kim Sa Nae, wife of a midlevel North Korean "diplomat", who was invited by Khan as part of a 20-member delegation was shot to death a few yards from Khan's official residence after she was suspected to be a spy for the United States by the ISI that subsequently informed the North Korean authorities. Privately, some Pakistani intelligence sources leaked this information to the Los Angeles Times. 3 days after Kim's death, both P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, warheads, and technical data, along with Kim's body, were flown to North Korea in the same American made C-130 cargo plane that was making rounds between Pakistan and North Korea from 1997-2002. In 2003, merchant vessel BBC China was caught carrying nuclear centrifuges to Libya from Malaysia, the Scomi Group and Khan Research Laboratories were supplying nuclear parts to Libya through Khan's Dubai-based Sri Lankan associate Buhary Syed Abu Tahir. This was further revealed in the Scomi Precision Engineering nuclear scandal surrounding Scomi CEO Shah Hakim Zain and Kamaluddin Abdullah, son of former Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. In 2005, when Vladimir Putin raised concerns about Pakistan's proliferation network and nuclear transfers to Iran with George W. Bush, the latter said he had pressured Pervez Musharraf on the issue, stating: "I told him we’re worried about transfers to Iran and North Korea. They put A.Q. Khan in jail; and some of his buddies under house arrest. We want to know what they said. I keep reminding Musharraf of that. Either he’s getting nothing or he’s not being forthcoming," reflecting doubts. Libya negotiated with the United States to roll back its nuclear program to have economic sanctions lifted, effected by the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, and shipped centrifuges to the United States that were identified as P-1 models by the American inspectors. Ultimately, the Bush administration launched its investigation of Khan, focusing on his personal role, when Libya handed over a list of its suppliers. Friedrich Tinner, a nuclear engineer and friend of Khan since their days at the Leuven University, was one of the heads of Libya's nuclear programme and worked in nuclear enrichment for Libya and Pakistan. In 2008, German nuclear engineer Gotthard Lerch was convicted and sentenced to five years and six months in prison for procuring centrifuges for Libya from Khan, Lerch also acted as Khan's middleman for Iran. Alfred Hempel, a German businessman, arranged the shipment of gas centrifuge parts from Khan in Pakistan to Libya and Iran via Dubai. The "A.Q. Khan network" involved numerous shell companies set-up by Khan in Dubai to obtain equipment necessary for nuclear enrichment. From 1999 onwards, Khan travelled to Dubai 41 times according to the Pakistan government. Khan also kept a penthouse on posh al-Maktoum Road. The shell companies consisting of "a fax machine and an empty office" would be used to facilitate shipments and shut down immediately after the deals. Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group of Iran's Defense Industries Organization was involved in nuclear proliferation for Iran and North Korea through China. Parts needed for nuclear enrichment in Pakistan were also imported by Khan from several Japanese companies.