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| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economist | 3/4 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economist | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T10:09:41.732649+00:00 | kb-cron |
==== Finance and professional orientation ==== The growing centrality of finance goes hand in hand with the rise of business schools, which employ an increasingly large share of economists and occupy a growing place in top journals, while authors affiliated with public institutions become less common. Symbolically, this shifts the intellectual and political centre of gravity of the profession towards the world of business, with greater support for the private sector, deregulation, and limits on public intervention, and it fuels the idea of a partial convergence between the interests of the profession and those of finance, which may help explain changes in economists’ political stances. In this context, scholars also describe a “fix-it” culture among economists: a strong confidence in their ability to propose solutions and correct malfunctions, relying on tools they regard as effective and scientific. This suggests that this influence can reinforce the higher status often accorded to economists, while also leaving them particularly exposed in the public arena: in times of crisis, they are among the first to be questioned and blamed.
==== Influence in the state ==== Some authors report a paradox in this diagnosis of the “superiority” of economists. From the outside, as mentioned, economists appear as the most powerful social science within the state: decision-makers have grown accustomed to turning to their expertise, and economists occupy key positions in central banks, ministries of finance, international organisations and advisory councils. They are widely perceived as the experts who “really understand” the economy, including by the general public. But from the inside, many economists feel that their influence is not so substantial and appears to them to be highly constrained: in high-stakes policy debates (the euro crisis, climate policy, welfare state reform), partisan conflicts and institutional interests often prevail over expert advice, even when economists broadly agree among themselves. Symbolic and material supremacy can translate into policy influence through three main channels: the high level of professional authority economics enjoys, which makes it a natural point of reference when “the economy” is at stake; economists occupying strategic positions inside the state and international organisations, so that in some domains they are not just advisers but direct decision-makers; and economics shaping the cognitive infrastructure of policymaking, as economic modes of reasoning (incentives, efficiency, growth, cost–benefit trade-offs) and technical tools (indicators, models, evaluation procedures) diffuse beyond the profession and structure how non-economist officials see and frame problems.
==== Scientization of policy advice ==== The rising influence of economists in decision-making spheres goes hand in hand with a broader trend: the “scientization” of policy advice. This is described as the third major trend, adding to externalization (the increasing reliance on actors outside the traditional civil service) and politicization (stronger partisan control over advice and greater use of political advisers). In this context, it refers to the growing dependence of decision-makers on academic experts and on arguments explicitly presented as scientific. In the field of economic policy, this means that governments turn more systematically to academic economists and that commission reports are increasingly grounded in economic research, rather than solely in bureaucratic experience or stakeholder input. Within this broader trend, economics has been especially well positioned. First, its abstract, mathematical formalism, which brings it closer to a hard science, gives it a rational, scientific and objective appeal. Second, in the post-war period, economics presents itself as a general technique of government, not only competent in the realm of “pure” economics, but also as a producer of tools that can be transposed to a wide range of public policy domains, from labour markets to pensions, and from climate regulation to healthcare. Finally, the strong internal hierarchy of the profession provides its own clearly identified instances of validation (top departments and journals), which serves to legitimize and boost the credibility of economics, giving its policy recommendations the appearance of a scientific consensus. For these reasons, decision-makers tend to turn to economists when they seek “scientific” justifications for their policies. However, public policy advice should not be reduced to academic economics alone. A citation analysis shows that commission reports continue to draw on a mixed knowledge base: alongside articles in international journals, they frequently cite national policy documents, studies produced by central banks and statistical offices, as well as applied research carried out by public agencies. Scientization thus adds an academic layer rather than replacing other forms of knowledge. It has also been shown that scientization can fulfil both an instrumental and a legitimating function.
==== Technocracy and limits ==== As a performative field, much of economists’ political influence is indirect. Economists rarely “impose” policies on elected officials. They design concepts, metrics and decision tools, what authors call the cognitive and technical infrastructure of policy, that become embedded in bureaucratic routines. Devices such as GDP, unemployment rates, cost–benefit analysis, or auction rules narrow the range of options that appear reasonable and make some trade-offs visible while hiding others. This contributes to a form of economic technocracy: many key choices are framed as technical and delegated to experts, even though the underlying assumptions are normative and contestable. On the limits of this technocracy: economists are most influential in ill-defined or technical issues and in the early stages of agenda-setting, and much less so when conflicts become highly politicised. A clear illustration of how neoliberal reform can extend beyond macroeconomic policy and into institutional design can be observed in Chile under Pinochet. Reforms associated with the “Chicago Boys” (economists trained in the Chicago tradition who advised the regime) also reshaped higher education through market viability. The rapid expansion of private schools, the concentration of programs in commercially valued fields (law, engineering, accountancy, commerce, management,...), and the marginalization of humanities illustrate how reforms framed as technical and modernizing can embed market principles into public infrastructures, reshaping both educational supply and who gains access.