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| title | chunk | source | category | tags | date_saved | instance |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anchoring effect | 3/6 | https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anchoring_effect | reference | science, encyclopedia | 2026-05-05T09:57:19.378582+00:00 | kb-cron |
=== Anchoring-and-adjusting === The most prevalent explanation of the anchoring effect is the argument originally made by Tversky and Kahneman, termed anchoring-and-adjusting. Based on this theory, individuals set an anchor according to available information, whether it is provided or individuals already have an anchor in mind, and use this anchor as a point of reference to adjust their answers. This theory explains inaccuracy in guessing by suggesting that people adjust insufficiently, rendering their final guess closer to the anchors. This phenomenon was further investigated in other studies and used as an explanation for biases such as hindsight bias and egocentric bias. For instance, when asked to guess the price of a drink in a coffee shop, individuals often look for the price of other drinks or recall the price of similar drinks at other stores, and base their answer on the anchor that they set. Specifically, the original study found that by simply providing an arbitrary anchor to each group, people provided significantly different responses, suggesting that their answers were generated through anchoring and adjusting. In addition, this finding suggests that individuals are gullible when setting an anchor, and almost automatically begin the anchoring-and-adjusting process. On the other hand, Epley and Gilovich found that when anchors are self-generated, people will stop adjusting once they believe they have adjusted their answers to an acceptable range. Although this process does not guarantee insufficient adjustments, it does result in an answer that is as close to the anchor as possible in the acceptable range. However, insufficient adjustments are diminished when individuals are able and motivated by external factors, such as monetary compensation, to continue adjusting for a more accurate answer, thereby reducing the anchoring effect. The anchoring effect is also reduced when individuals know which way to adjust from the anchor because it eliminates the possible answers by half. Besides general knowledge, anchoring is also observed in social settings. The simulation theory of empathy suggests that people use their own mental state and reasoning to infer the actions of others. People assume that those who are similar to us will act in a similar way. Aligned with this idea, Tamir and Mitchell found that judgments of the attitude of others are made more quickly for those who are similar to the judge, and greater self-other discrepancy resulted in longer reaction time. In this case, individuals use their own attitudes as an anchor and make adjustments to predict the attitude of others. Note that this process only takes place when the judge perceives great similarity between self and others. Overall, this theory describes the process of anchoring and adjusting away from the anchor, as well as the phenomenon of inaccurate responses due to insufficient adjusting. However, proponents of alternative theories argued that adjusting is only possible when the original anchor lies outside the acceptable range. According to Epley and Gilovich, individuals will not adjust at all and give an answer that is identical to their anchor if the anchor is already within the acceptable range. Using the previous example, the actual price of the drink can be identical to other drinks served at that store, meaning that people should theoretically consider their anchor as a potential answer rather than adjusting. When a reasonable anchor is given, there will be no adjustment. Therefore, this theory does not explain all cases of anchoring.
=== Selective accessibility === An alternative explanation of the anchoring effect is the idea that the accessibility of anchor-consistent information is enhanced when individuals consider it as a potential answer. After determining that the initial anchor is not the correct answer, they move on to consider other possibilities. However, because the anchor was just made salient and accessible to them, they will take the anchor into consideration while evaluating other possibilities. As a result, this comparative assessment can result in answers that are disproportionally consistent with the anchor. In this sense, anchoring is a special case of semantic priming, where the anchor acts as the prime. Unlike anchoring-and-adjusting, this theory suggests that people consider the relevant attributes of the initial anchor to determine if the anchor is plausible. Rather than accepting any plausible anchor as their answer and insufficiently adjusting anchors outside of the acceptable range, people will remain motivated to find a more accurate answer after rejecting the initial anchor. The preceding adjustments that individuals make are relevant to the anchor because people evaluate hypotheses through attempting to confirm them. In line with this idea, when investigating whether the plausibility of an anchor affects comparative and absolute judgments, Strack and Mussweiler found that individuals take longer to provide an absolute judgment when the anchor is implausible. Comparative judgments refer to the process of using an anchor to determine the final answer. Most paradigms used in anchoring studies also ask participants to provide an absolute judgment (i.e., provide a concrete number as their answer) after comparative judgments. When plausible anchors were used in comparative judgments, the anchor became more accessible, shortening the response time for consequent absolute judgments. In contrast, implausible anchors result in longer response time because there is no relevant information that can be used as primes. Although selective accessibility and anchoring-and-adjusting provide conflicting explanations for the anchoring effect, some scholars have argued that anchoring is influenced by multiple factors, and these theories complement each other in explaining the anchoring effect. For instance, Simmons and colleagues proposed an integrative theory suggesting that an anchor can result in selective reliance on anchor-consistent information, rendering the range of plausible answers closer to the anchor. On the other hand, people adjust away from (or possibly back toward) anchors before settling on their final estimate. This integrative theory is more parsimonious because it suggests that neither the source of the anchor (self-generated or provided) nor the plausibility of the anchor has a significant effect on judgments.