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data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Quality_Act-0.md
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title: "Data Quality Act"
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source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Quality_Act"
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category: "reference"
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tags: "science, encyclopedia"
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The Information Quality Act (IQA) or Data Quality Act (DQA), passed through the United States Congress in Section 515 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 (Pub. L. 106–554 (text) (PDF)). Because the Act was a two-sentence rider in a spending bill, it had no name given in the actual legislation. The Government Accountability Office uses the name "Information Quality Act".
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IQA directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to issue government-wide guidelines that "provide policy and procedural guidance to federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies". Other federal agencies are also required to publish their own guidelines for information quality and peer review agendas.
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== Text of the IQA ==
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Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001 Sec. 515 reads:
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(a) In General. – The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall, by not later than September 30, 2001, and with public and Federal agency involvement, issue guidelines under sections 3504(d)(1) and 3516 of title 44, United States Code, that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies in fulfillment of the purposes and provisions of chapter 35 of title 44, United States Code, commonly referred to as the Paperwork Reduction Act.
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(b) Content of Guidelines. – The guidelines under subsection (a) shall –
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(1) apply to the sharing by Federal agencies of, and access to, information disseminated by Federal agencies; and
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(2) require that each Federal agency to which the guidelines apply –
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(A) issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by the agency, by not later than 1 year after the date of issuance of the guidelines under subsection (a);
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(B) establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that does not comply with the guidelines issued under subsection (a); and
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(C) report periodically to the Director –
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(i) the number and nature of complaints received by the agency regarding the accuracy of information disseminated by the agency; and
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(ii) how such complaints were handled by the agency.
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== Guidelines developed pursuant to IQA ==
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=== OMB guidelines ===
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OMB, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, Final Guidelines, with Request for Comments (Oct 1, 2001)
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OMB, Guidelines (Draft of Jan. 3, 2002)
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OMB, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, Final Guidelines (corrected), 67 Fed. Reg. 8452 (Feb. 22. 2002)
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=== Guidelines developed by agencies pursuant to IQA and OMB guidelines ===
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Federal Trade Commission FTC Information Quality Guidelines
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Health and Human Services HHS Information Quality / Peer Review Ensuring the Quality of Information Disseminated by HHS Agencies
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NASA Requirements for Documentation, Approval, and Dissemination of NASA Scientific and Technical Information
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Patent and Trademark Office Information Quality Guidelines Archived 2010-03-23 at the Wayback Machine
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List of links to all Cabinet, Executive Agency, and Independent Regulatory Agency guidelines
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== Criticism ==
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The Data Quality Act has been criticized as providing a vehicle for special interest groups to challenge regulations on the grounds of not meeting information quality requirements. However, others view unchecked data and lack of peer-review as a tool of political corruption leading to the imposition of arbitrary and capricious regulations. The "driving force behind the IQA", Jim Tozzi, said "there’s no doubt that we were funded by industry" and they wanted the IQA to be used as a tool to challenge government information. However, it does not confer any right to judicial review if people have sought to change information and been unsuccessful in convincing the agency (see below).
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data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Quality_Act-1.md
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title: "Data Quality Act"
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source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Quality_Act"
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category: "reference"
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tags: "science, encyclopedia"
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== Information Quality Act failing as a basis for law suits ==
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The Competitive Enterprise Institute filed a lawsuit to prevent dissemination of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)'s "Climate Action Report 2002" published May 2002, claiming the research did not meet requirements of the Federal Data Quality Act (FDQA), which came into effect in October 2002. The case was dismissed in November 2003.
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In 2004, a multi-party dispute regarding the management of the Missouri River led to a case in which the District Court declared that "the IQA directs the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") to issue guidelines that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by the agency, the plain language of the legislation fails to define these terms. 44 U.S.C. § 3516. Moreover, the history of the legislation fails to provide any indication as to the scope of these terms. Absent any "meaningful standard" against which to evaluate the agency's discretion, the Court finds that Congress did not intend the IQA to provide a private cause of action, and therefore Blaske Marine Plaintiffs' IQA claim fails."
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Four days after this judgement the Department of Justice reiterated that "The language of the IQA reflects Congress's intent that any challenges to the quality of information disseminated by federal agencies should take place in administrative proceedings before federal agencies and not in the courts. The first and only court to address this issue determined that the IQA does not provide for a private cause of action.”.
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This statement was made in a brief that successfully asked for the dismissal of a lawsuit lodged by the Salt Institute (a salt-producers' association) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce against the Department of Health and Human Services in federal court using the Information Quality Act. The suit alleged that federal scientists lacked evidence that salt was harmful to health but was dismissed by a trial and appellate court. The Journal of the American Dietetic Association and the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute (NHLBI) which is part of the US National Institutes of Health claimed that the food industry is adding too much salt to foods. The motion to dismiss was granted "because the Plaintiffs lack standing to sue, there is no private right of action under the Information Quality Act, and the NHLBI's actions regarding the DASH-Sodium Trial data are not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act."
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In July 2019, the Department of Justice maintained that there was "no basis" for lawsuits based on the Information Quality Act. Protect Democracy Project Inc. and the Brennan Center for Justice had filed a suit demanding the U. S. Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security correct a report linking immigration with terrorism. The report remained online, unchanged.
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== External links ==
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Susan Bisong, Federal Agencies Subject to Data Quality Act gives the historical background and purposes of the DQA (FindLaw)
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Information Quality Act, from the Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP)
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Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, DataQualityAct.US
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OMB Watch, Data Quality Act
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GAO Report September 2005, Information Quality Act: National Agricultural Statistics Service Implements First Steps, but Documentation of Census of Agriculture Could Be Improved
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GAO report on implementation
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=== Commentary ===
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Center for Effective Government
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Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, "The Data Quality Act: A revolution in the role of science in policy making or a can of worms?"
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Rick Weiss, The Washington Post, August 16, 2004, "'Data Quality' Law Is Nemesis Of Regulation"
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Chris Mooney, Boston Globe, August 28, 2005, "Thanks to a little-known piece of legislation, scientists at the EPA and other agencies find their work questioned not only by industry, but by their own government"
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Chris Mooney, The Republican War on Science (New York: Basic Books, 2005 ISBN 0465046754), ch. 8 ("Wine, Jazz, and 'Data Quality'"), pp. 102–20.
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Urs Gasser, "Information Quality and the Law, or, How to Catch a Difficult Horse"
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Catherine Campbell Meshkin, "Unchecked Data: A Tool for Political Corruption?" Engage Volume 11, Issue 3, December 2010
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== References ==
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data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_standard-0.md
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source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_standard"
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In United States federal law, the Daubert standard ( DAW-bərt) is a rule of evidence regarding the admissibility of expert witness testimony. A party may raise a Daubert motion, a special motion in limine raised before or during trial, to exclude the presentation of unqualified evidence to the jury. The Daubert trilogy are the three United States Supreme Court cases that articulated the Daubert standard:
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), which held that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate the Frye standard as a basis for assessing the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, but that the rule incorporated a flexible reliability standard instead;
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General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997), which held that a district court judge may exclude expert testimony when there are gaps between the evidence relied on by an expert and that person's conclusion, and that an abuse-of-discretion standard of review is the proper standard for appellate courts to use in reviewing a trial court's decision of whether it should admit expert testimony;
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Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), which held that the judge's gatekeeping function identified in Daubert applies to all expert testimony, including that which is non-scientific.
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Important appellate-level opinions that clarify the standard include Judge Alex Kozinski's opinion in Daubert on remand, and Judge Edward Becker's opinion.
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== Definition ==
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In Daubert, seven members of the court agreed on the following guidelines for admitting scientific expert testimony:
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Judge is gatekeeper: Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the task of "gatekeeping", or assuring that scientific expert testimony truly proceeds from "scientific knowledge", rests on the trial judge.
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Relevance and reliability: This requires the trial judge to ensure that the expert's testimony is "relevant to the task at hand" and that it rests "on a reliable foundation". Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584-587. Concerns about expert testimony cannot be simply referred to the jury as a question of weight. Furthermore, the admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Rule 104(a), not Rule 104(b); thus, the judge must find it more likely than not that the expert's methods are reliable and reliably applied to the facts at hand.
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Scientific knowledge = scientific method/methodology: A conclusion will qualify as scientific knowledge if the proponent can demonstrate that it is the product of sound "scientific methodology" derived from the scientific method.
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Illustrative factors: The court defined "scientific methodology" as the process of formulating hypotheses and then conducting experiments to prove or falsify the hypothesis, and provided a set of illustrative factors (i.e., not a "test") in determining whether these criteria are met:
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Whether the theory or technique employed by the expert is generally accepted in the scientific community;
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Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication;
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Whether it can be and has been tested;
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Whether it has a known error rate; and
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Whether the research was conducted independent of the particular litigation or dependent on an intention to provide the proposed testimony.
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In 2000, the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 was amended in an attempt to codify and structure elements embodied in the "Daubert trilogy".
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== Use ==
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Although the Daubert standard is now the law in federal court and over half of the states, the Frye standard remains the law in some jurisdictions including California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Florida passed a bill to adopt the Daubert standard as the law governing expert witness testimony, which took effect on July 1, 2013. On May 23, 2019, the Florida Supreme Court accepted the Daubert standard. On August 28, 2020, The Maryland Court of Appeals adopted the Daubert standard.
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Although trial judges have always had the authority to exclude inappropriate testimony, prior to Daubert, trial courts often preferred to let juries hear evidence proffered by both sides. Once certain evidence has been excluded by a Daubert motion because it fails to meet the relevancy and reliability standard, it will likely be challenged when introduced again in another trial. Even though a Daubert motion is not binding to other courts of law, if something was found untrustworthy by one court, other judges may choose to follow that precedent. Of course, a decision by an appellate court that a piece of evidence is inadmissible under Daubert would be binding on district courts within that court's jurisdiction. An evidentiary hearing on the motion may not be necessary if the court finds that it would not assist the court in ruling on any of the matters in the motion.
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data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_standard-1.md
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title: "Daubert standard"
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source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daubert_standard"
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category: "reference"
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=== Timing ===
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To attack expert testimony as inadmissible, counsel may bring pretrial motions, including motions in limine. The motion in limine may be brought prior to trial, although counsel may bring the motion during trial as well. A motion attacking expert testimony should be brought within a reasonable time after the close of discovery if the grounds for the objection can be reasonably anticipated. The hearing should be made well in advance of the first time a case appears on a trial calendar.
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In one case where a Daubert hearing was conducted on the day of the trial, in which the district court excluded all plaintiff's expert testimony, resulting in the dismissal of all claims, the appellate court remanded the case because of multiple irregularities and a defective record of lower court proceedings. The appellate court noted that in cases that rely heavily on expert testimony, a district court should set a discovery and trial schedule that realistically provides both sides with an adequate opportunity to introduce necessary evidence. The application of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to proposed expert testimony can often be an uncertain process and is best conducted in such a manner that litigants have a reasonable opportunity to locate experts who meet the rule's requirements.
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In another case in which the defendant was apparently at fault for filing a motion to exclude expert testimony one week before the trial date, the district court denied the motion on that ground, but it advised the defendant that it might conduct its own voir dire of the expert in question before he testified. The district court preliminarily found that defendant's motion was predicated on a ruling made almost three months earlier by a district court in another state, and that defendant had shown no good cause for waiting to file the motion. The defendant ultimately lost that case, following the admission of the disputed expert testimony, and ultimately failed in its appeal.
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== History ==
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Prior to Daubert, relevancy in combination with the Frye standard were the dominant standards for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence in Federal courts. Frye is based on a 1923 Federal Court of appeals ruling involving the admissibility of polygraph evidence. Under Frye, the court based the admissibility of testimony regarding novel scientific evidence on whether it has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs". The trial court's gatekeeper role in this respect is typically described as conservative, thus helping to keep pseudoscience out of the courtroom by deferring to those in the field.
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In Daubert, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1923 Frye standard was superseded by the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence, specifically Rule 702 governing expert testimony. Rule 702 originally stated (in its entirety),
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
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In Daubert, the court ruled that nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert evidence "gives any indication that 'general acceptance' is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules' liberal thrust and their general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony." By requiring experts to provide relevant opinions grounded in reliable methodology, proponents of Daubert were satisfied that these standards would result in a fair and rational resolution of the scientific and technological issues which lie at the heart of product liability adjudication. Daubert has not appeared to further the Federal Rules philosophy of admitting generally all relevant testimony, and specifically of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony. The Daubert decision has instead been heralded by some political commentators as one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in imposing higher barriers for toxic tort and product liability cases, by allegedly reducing the volume of so-called junk science in the court room.
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According to a 2002 RAND study, following Daubert, the percentage of expert testimony by scientists that was excluded from the courtroom significantly rose. This rise likely contributed to a doubling in successful motions for summary judgment in which 90% were against plaintiffs. Beyond this study, there is little empirical evidence of the impact of Daubert. However, some critics argue that Daubert has disrupted the balance between plaintiffs and defendants: "The exclusion of expert testimony affects plaintiffs far more than defendants because plaintiffs may then not be able to meet their required burden of proof. Furthermore, there is little point in plaintiffs going to the expense of Daubert motions to exclude defendant's experts until they know if their case will proceed. So if more experts are now being excluded, then Daubert has undoubtedly shifted the balance between plaintiffs and defendants and made it more difficult for plaintiffs to litigate successfully." Similarly, Daubert hearings can be subject to various abuses by attorneys attempting to bolster a weak case. These tactics can range from simply attempting to delay the case to driving up the costs of the litigation forcing settlement.
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A different pattern has emerged in criminal cases. In criminal cases, the prosecution has the burden of proof and uses a host of forensic science methods as evidence to prove their case; but Daubert motions are rarely made by criminal defendants and when they do, they lose a majority of the challenges. Some critics of the use of unreliable science in court argue that Daubert has had beneficial effects in civil litigation, but fails to address the underlying pathologies of the forensic science system that leads to dubious verdicts in criminal cases.
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Some commentators believe that Daubert caused judges to become—in the phrase used in Chief Justice William Rehnquist's dissent in Daubert—amateur scientists, many lacking the scientific literacy to effectively fulfill their role as gatekeeper of scientific evidence. Although "science for judges" forums have emerged in the wake of Daubert in order to educate judges in a variety of scientific fields, many are still skeptical about the usefulness of the Daubert standard in discerning valid science. The responsibility to assess scientific relevance has shifted from highly trained expert witnesses to judges deficient in science education. The Daubert ruling furthermore admits the possible introduction of non-peer reviewed data and conclusions. This increasingly shifts the burden of scientific judgement onto judges who have not had an education which would enable them to properly evaluate such data.
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Pursuant to Rule 104(a), in Daubert the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that the following factors be considered:
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Has the technique been tested in actual field conditions (and not just in a laboratory)?
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Has the technique been subject to peer review and publication?
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What is the known or potential rate of error?
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Do standards exist for the control of the technique's operation?
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Has the technique been generally accepted within the relevant scientific community?
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The Supreme Court explicitly cautioned that the Daubert list should not be regarded by judges as "a definitive checklist or test". Yet in practice, judges have judged the admissibility of scientific evidence using the "Daubert factors" as a checklist; for example, the trial court judge in Kumho admitted to erroneously treating the factors as mandatory.
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category: "reference"
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== International influence ==
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The Canadian Supreme Court expressly discussed the Daubert standard in R. v. J.-L.J., [2000]. In J.-L.J., the court took a look at the development of U.S. law in this regard, noting the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of the Frye standard and its replacement with the Daubert standard. While the court did note that "Daubert must be read in light of the specific text of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which differs from our own procedures", the court also stated in the same sentence that "the U.S. Supreme Court did list a number of factors that could be helpful in evaluating the soundness of novel science." The court then incorporated elements from the Daubert standard in their decision regarding the Quebec Court of Appeal ruling while ultimately rejecting the lower court's decision and reinstating the defendant's conviction.
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Later, in 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada in White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co. [2015] 2 SCR 182 endorsed the parts of R v. J.-L.J. that cited Daubert, saying: "in the case of an opinion based on novel or contested science or science used for a novel purpose, the reliability of the underlying science for that purpose: J. (J.-L.), at paras. 33, 35–36 and 47". This suggests that reliability using the Daubert factors should be assessed when novel or contested science is adduced.
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Additionally, in 2005, the Science and Technology Select Committee of the United Kingdom House of Commons recommended the creation of a Forensic Science Advisory Council to regulate forensic evidence in the UK and observed that:
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The absence of an agreed protocol for the validation of scientific techniques prior to their being admitted in court is entirely unsatisfactory. Judges are not well-placed to determine scientific validity without input from scientists. We recommend that one of the first tasks of the Forensic Science Advisory Council be to develop a "gate-keeping" test for expert evidence. This should be done in partnership with judges, scientists and other key players in the criminal justice system, and should build on the US Daubert test.
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The Law Commission for England and Wales proposed a consultation paper (No.190) to adopt a criterion like the Daubert standard to help reform the law of evidence in regards to the admissibility of scientific evidence.
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== See also ==
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Frye standard
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== Notes ==
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== References ==
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== External links ==
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The Daubert Trilogy in the States
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Daubert on the Web
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Daubert-The Most Influential Supreme Court Decision You've Never Heard Of
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Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy (SKAPP) Archived 2011-02-01 at the Wayback Machine, collection of original documents and commentary on the Daubert standard and the use of science in public policy.
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Barry Yeoman Putting Science in the Dock, The Nation
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Bernstein, David (1 February 2007). "Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert Revolution". Iowa Law Review. George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 07-11, 2008. 93 (451). George Mason University School of Law. SSRN 963461. Date posted: 15 February 2007; Last revised: 28 November 2011
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Eric Helland, "The Role of Ideology in Judicial Evaluations of Experts," The Journal of Law and Economics 62, no. 4 (November 2019): 579-611.
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The Daubert Tracker
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title: "European law on drug precursors"
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source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_law_on_drug_precursors"
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category: "reference"
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European law on illicit drug precursors:
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Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 on drug precursors (contains list of substances)
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Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 of 22 December 2004 laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between the Union and third countries in drug precursors. Consolidated text (2021) (contains the same list of substances)
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Commission Regulation (EC) No 297/2009 of 8 April 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1277/2005 laying down implementing rules for Regulation (EC) No 273/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on drug precursors and for Council Regulation (EC) No 111/2005 laying down rules for the monitoring of trade between the Community and third countries in drug precursors
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The list of 23 substances is identical to list of UN-controlled drug precursors, except for the different categorization and inclusion of stereoisomers in EU Category 1.
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== List of substances ==
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=== Category 1 Precursors ===
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phenylacetone
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methyl 2-phenylacetoacetate (MAPA)
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methyl 2-methyl-3-phenyloxirane-2-carboxylate (BMK methyl glycidate)
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2-methyl-3-phenyloxirane-2-carboxylic acid (BMK glycidic acid)
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N-acetylanthranilic acid
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alpha-phenylacetoacetamide (APAA)
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alpha-phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN)
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isosafrole (cis + trans)
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3,4-methylenedioxyphenylpropan-2-one
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piperonal
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safrole
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methyl 3-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-methyloxirane-2-carboxylate (PMK methyl glycidate)
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3-(1,3-benzodioxol-5-yl)-2-methyloxirane-2-carboxylic acid (PMK glycidic acid)
|
||||
4-anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine (ANPP)
|
||||
N-phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP)
|
||||
ephedrine
|
||||
chloroephedrine
|
||||
pseudoephedrine
|
||||
chloropseudoephedrine
|
||||
norephedrine
|
||||
ergometrine
|
||||
ergotamine
|
||||
lysergic acid
|
||||
The stereoisomeric forms of the substances listed in this Category not being cathine, whenever the existence of such
|
||||
forms is possible.
|
||||
The salts of the substances listed in this Category whenever the existence of such salts is possible and not being the salts
|
||||
of cathine.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=== Category 2 Precursors ===
|
||||
red phosphorus
|
||||
acetic anhydride
|
||||
phenylacetic acid
|
||||
anthranilic acid
|
||||
piperidine
|
||||
potassium permanganate
|
||||
The salts of the substances listed in this Category whenever the existence of such salts is possible.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=== Category 3 Precursors ===
|
||||
hydrochloric acid (hydrogen chloride)
|
||||
sulphuric acid
|
||||
toluene
|
||||
diethyl ether
|
||||
acetone
|
||||
methylethylketone
|
||||
The salts of the substances listed in this Category whenever the existence of such salts is possible and not being the salts
|
||||
of hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=== Category 4 Precursors ===
|
||||
Medicinal products and veterinary medicinal products containing ephedrine or its salts
|
||||
Medicinal products and veterinary medicinal products containing pseudo-ephedrine or its salts
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== See also ==
|
||||
List of UN-controlled drug precursors
|
||||
List of US-controlled drug precursors
|
||||
Drug precursors
|
||||
European Council decisions on designer drugs
|
||||
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== References ==
|
||||
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction | Legal topic overviews: Classification of controlled drugs – The EU system
|
||||
18
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan-0.md
Normal file
18
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan-0.md
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@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Harvey v. Horan"
|
||||
chunk: 1/3
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:20.751122+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Harvey v. Horan, 278 F. 3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002), is a federal court case dealing with felons' rights of access to DNA testing. The Eastern Virginia District Court originally found that felons were entitled access to DNA testing on potentially exculpatory evidence, but this finding was later overturned by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Nevertheless, the case paved the way for the Innocence Protection Act, which ensures that convicted offenders can try to prove their innocence by requesting DNA testing on evidence in government's possession that was used in their case.
|
||||
|
||||
== The case ==
|
||||
On April 30, 1990, James Harvey was convicted of rape and forcible sodomy by a jury in Fairfax County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison. One piece of evidence used to convict Harvey was restriction fragment length polymorphism ("RFLP") DNA testing. The victim had two assailants, and this test prevented both Harvey and his co-defendant from being excluded as a possible source of spermatozoa recovered from the victim through conventional serology. Harvey was also implicated by testimony from his co-defendant, the victim, and a third prosecution witness. However, this testimony indicated that Harvey had not ejaculated during the attack.
|
||||
Harvey did not appeal his conviction but did file a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His petition was rejected by the Virginia Supreme Court in 1993. On February 25, 1994, Harvey filed action in federal district court against the Governor of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a post-Civil War civil rights statute that allows citizens to sue state and local officials in federal courts for constitutional violations. He claimed that the state's failure to re-test biological evidence from the case was a violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause. On July 25, 1995, the district court dismissed Harvey's petition, finding that he had not exhausted state remedies and would have to refile his claim for DNA testing as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
|
||||
In 1996, the New York-based Innocence Project contacted the Virginia Division of Forensic Science on Harvey's behalf, requesting the biological evidence form the case. The Innocence Project wanted to re-test the evidence using short tandem repeat ("STR") DNA testing, which was unavailable at the time of Harvey's trial. The Division of Forensic Science recommended that the Innocence Project bring its request to the Fairfax County Commonwealth's Attorney's office. The Innocence Project made this request in February 1998 and July 1999. In October 1999, Commonwealth attorney Robert F. Horan Jr. denied the request for access to the evidence, asserting that even if Harvey were excluded as a contributor of genetic material, it would not prove his innocence due to the testimony indicating that he had not left any biological evidence behind.
|
||||
Harvey then filed action in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harvey's attorneys cited this statute, which is most often used in cases of police brutality, because Harvey's previous lawyers had missed a filing deadline in the more common criminal appeals process. They argued that Harvey's right to due process was infringed because he was denied access to potentially exculpatory evidence. They said that the test could be decisive if it yielded certain result — for example, if the laboratory identified DNA from two men and neither of them was Harvey. They also noted that although the prosecutor claimed that his office would allow DNA testing in appropriate cases, Fairfax had never found an appropriate case.
|
||||
On April 16, 2001, in Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. District Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr. ruled that Horan had violated Harvey's right to due process under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment by refusing the test. In a 13-page opinion, Bryan stated, "due process is not a technical conception with a fixed concept unrelated to time, place and circumstances. It is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." He found that Harvey had a due process right of access to the DNA evidence under Brady v. Maryland (1963) because the material could prove to be exculpatory evidence, asserting that "denying the plaintiff access to potentially powerful exculpatory evidence would result in . . . a miscarriage of justice." Significantly, Bryan also concluded that Harvey's claim was not in effect a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because Harvey was not seeking immediate release from prison or challenging his conviction. The judge ordered Horan to send all the evidence to the Virginia State Laboratory for testing. Although Bryant's decision was not binding in other courts, it was significant because Bryant was the first judge to issue such an order.
|
||||
21
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan-1.md
Normal file
21
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan-1.md
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@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Harvey v. Horan"
|
||||
chunk: 2/3
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:20.751122+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
== The appeal ==
|
||||
On September 26, 2001, Horan's lawyer, Jack L. Gould, appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. He contended that § 1983 was not an appropriate vehicle for Harvey's action. He stated that the procedural flaws in the claim required that it be dismissed because it was really a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus and an attempt to get around strict rules and deadlines.
|
||||
On January 23, 2002, the court concluded that Harvey's rights had not been violated and that the lower court had erred in its decision. Fourth Circuit Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer joined. Judge King wrote a concurring opinion.
|
||||
The majority opinion stated that the claim was, in effect, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought without leave of court. According to a previous case, Heck v. Humphrey (1994), a convicted criminal defendant cannot bring a § 1983 action that would "necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence" unless the defendant can prove that his "conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." In this decision, the Supreme Court found that civil tort actions are "not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments." As such, the majority opinion in the appeal overturned the lower court's ruling because it found that Harvey had substantively failed to make a claim under § 1983. Judge Wilkinson wrote that Harvey had attempted to circumvent habeas corpus requirements, which required exhaustion of remedies at the state level before moving to the federal level. By bringing his claim directly to federal court under § 1983, Harvey had violated procedure:
|
||||
|
||||
While we agree with Harvey that the question of guilt or innocence lies at the heart of the criminal justice system, we also believe that the proper process for raising violations of constitutional rights in criminal proceedings cannot be abandoned. Because the substance of a claim cannot be severed from the proper manner of presenting it, we find Harvey's § 1983 action to be deficient.
|
||||
The opinion went on to state that Harvey's action under § 1983 "sought to invalidate a final state conviction whose lawfulness has in no way been impugned". Harvey claimed that he was challenging neither the fact nor the duration of his confinement, pointing out that he merely seeks evidence which could also prove his guilt. The court found this argument to be an evasion, saying, "He is trying to use a § 1983 action as a discovery device to overturn his state conviction". The majority opinion asserted that the finality of convictions could not be challenged by advances in technology:
|
||||
|
||||
The possibility of post-conviction developments, whether in law or science, is simply too great to justify judicially sanctioned constitutional attacks upon final criminal judgments. …Establishing a constitutional due process right under § 1983 to retest evidence with each forward step in forensic science would leave perfectly valid judgments in a perpetually unsettled state.
|
||||
According to the majority opinion, the only purpose of Harvey's claim was to challenge his conviction based on evidence that was available to him at the time of his trial. As such, the court concluded that Harvey's rights had not been violated by Horan. The court also stated that Harvey could only make his claim in habeas corpus, but that even if he had the court would be forced to dismiss it, for he had already filed such a petition in federal court.
|
||||
Circuit Judge King concurred in part and in judgment with the majority decision. While he agreed that the lower court's decision was incorrect, he also contended that Harvey's claim could properly be brought under § 1983. The judge stated that the act of providing Harvey access to evidence did not alone necessarily imply the invalidity of Harvey's conviction. King agrees with Harvey's attorney, Peter J. Neufeld, that the evidence could indeed inculpate Harvey and thus that § 1983 was a proper vehicle for bringing the action. However, King determined that since the material had been available to him at trial and since he had not been denied access to the legal system or evidence known to be exculpatory, Harvey did not have a legal claim to discover evidence under Brady v. Maryland. He stated that Harvey's claim was invalid not because he violated procedure, but because he could not prove that a state actor deprived him of a federally protected right.
|
||||
26
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan-2.md
Normal file
26
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan-2.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Harvey v. Horan"
|
||||
chunk: 3/3
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvey_v._Horan"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:20.751122+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
== Fallout ==
|
||||
After the January 2002 decision was handed down, Harvey applied to Virginia's Fairfax Circuit Court for DNA testing based on a 2001 law allowing felons increased access to potentially exculpatory biological evidence that had not previously been subjected to the current DNA testing method. On March 1, 2002, the court ordered the Division of Forensic Science to conduct the testing. On May 15, 2002, after the testing was completed, the division filed a certificate of analysis stating that Harvey could not be eliminated as a possible contributor to the sperm fractions found on the victim. On September 24, 2002, Harvey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Virginia Supreme Court, challenging the validity of the certificate of analysis and related test results. The court dismissed the petition on June 10, 2004, saying that it did not have jurisdiction to consider it.
|
||||
Back in March 2002, the federal appeal had come before the full Fourth Circuit as an en banc reconsideration (as opposed to the original three-judge panel). By this time, the issue was moot, but two judges, J. Michael Luttig and Wilkinson, wrote anyway. Luttig wrote that the "right of access to evidence for tests which ... could prove beyond any doubt that the individual in fact did not commit the crime, is constitutionally required ... as a matter of basic fairness." Luttig also concluded that there is "a limited, constitutional, post-conviction right of access to previously produced forensic evidence for the purpose of [DNA] testing." Wilkinson responded by expressing hope that inmates like Harvey would have access to DNA testing but that it was a matter for the legislature to decide. Significantly, his majority opinion in the original appeal stated, "our decision reflects the core democratic ideal that if this entitlement is to be conferred, it should be accomplished by legislative action rather than by a federal court as a matter of constitutional right."
|
||||
Wilkinson's hopes were manifested with the passage of the bipartisan Innocence Protection Act in 2004. On February 10, 2000, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced the act after devoting nearly a year to evaluating flaws in the administration of the death penalty nationwide. A few months later, the bill was introduced in the House by Bill Delahunt (D-MA) and Ray LaHood (R-IL). Innocence Project co-founders Neufeld and Barry C. Scheck testified several times over the next few years as witnesses before hearings of committee on the Act. Both mentioned the Harvey v. Horan case in their testimony, saying that it was significant for being the first federal court decision in the country to recognize a constitutional right of access to post-conviction DNA testing. The Innocence Protection Act eventually passed in the House of Representatives by an overwhelming majority (393–14) on November 5, 2003. On October 9, 2004, the legislation, which was sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy, passed unanimously in the United States Senate after narrowly moving through the Senate Judiciary Committee.
|
||||
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of a due process right to DNA testing in District Attorney's Office v. Osborne. The court decided that prisoners did not have a right to the testing. The decision only affects those few states that do not have laws similar to the federal Innocence Protection Act that explicitly give prisoners a right to DNA evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
== Resources ==
|
||||
U.S. Judge Says Felons Entitled to DNA Tests - The Washington Post
|
||||
VA Judge: Inmates have right to DNA tests - The Associated Press
|
||||
Appeal from the United States District Court
|
||||
Virginia Supreme Court decision
|
||||
Post-conviction ethics
|
||||
Conservative US Circuit Court Judges Back Post-Conviction DNA Testing
|
||||
The Innocence Protection Act in the 108th Congress
|
||||
|
||||
== References ==
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Institute for Law, Science and Global Security"
|
||||
chunk: 1/1
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_Law,_Science_and_Global_Security"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:21.974381+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The Institute for Law, Science and Global Security in the Department of Government at Georgetown University was established to promote teaching and research in the area of intersection between international law and international relations. The Institute sponsors undergraduate and graduate courses and runs a Master's Program in International Law and Global Security. The Institute seeks to inform the public policy debate about the nature, role and importance of international law as it connected to issues of science and global security. To this end, it sponsors a series of specific programs including the Program on Non-Proliferation Law and Policy, which is jointly run with the James Martin Center of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
|
||||
Most recently, the Institute has begun a special initiative in the area of cyber security. Among the participants in this initiative have been former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency General Michael Hayden, Siobhan Gorman, national security correspondent of The Wall Street Journal, and Suzanne Spaulding, former General Counsel for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Since its creation, the Institute has also sponsored events with a variety of other speakers, including Paul D. Clement, former Solicitor General of the United States, Bill Richardson, the Governor of New Mexico, Neal Katyal, Deputy Solicitor General of the United States and legal counsel to former detainee Salim Hamdan, and David H. Remes, a former partner at Covington & Burling and currently representing detainees in the Guantanamo Bay detention camps.
|
||||
The Institute was founded by Professors Christopher C. Joyner and Anthony Clark Arend, and was initially called The Institute for International Law and Politics. It is currently directed by Professor Joyner, and Professor Catherine Lotrionte serves as the Associate Director of the Institute. Amit Yoran, former Chief of the National Cyber Security Division at the Department of Homeland Security and Phillip A. Karber serve on the Board of Advisers of the Institute. From 2007 to 2009, Brendan P. Geary—previously an Associate Attorney at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP and currently an Attorney in the Department of Justice's National Security Division—served as the Institute's William V. O'Brien Fellow.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== References ==
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== External links ==
|
||||
Institute for Law, Science and Global Security Home Page Archived 2019-01-24 at the Wayback Machine
|
||||
Video: Cyber Security, Law and Policy: An Integration of Disciplines [1] Archived 2010-06-24 at the Wayback Machine
|
||||
33
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Liégeois-0.md
Normal file
33
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Liégeois-0.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Jules Liégeois"
|
||||
chunk: 1/7
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Liégeois"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:26.427074+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Jules Joseph Liégeois (30 November 1833 – 14 August 1908), Knight of the Legion of Honour ("Chevalier de l'Ordre de la Légion d'Honneur"), and the Professor of administrative law at the University of Nancy for forty years, was a universally respected French jurist who was also widely known as an important foundation member, promoter, and defender of the Nancy School of Hypnosis — some would even say "the founder" of the School, not "just a participant" (Touzeil-Divina, 2024a).
|
||||
In addition to his numerous influential publications on administrative law and the relationship between economics and the law, he was internationally recognized for the significance, scope, and systematic nature of his critical and innovative personal investigations into natural/spontaneous somnambulism, hypnotism, and hypnotic suggestion in the wider medico-legal domain. He "was the first forensic scientist to scientifically address the medical question of hypnotism", and "was the leading researcher in the nineteenth century into the possibilities of the abuse of hypnosis for the purposes of crime", not only in the sense of crimes committed upon a hypnotized subject, and those committed by a hypnotized subject, but also in the sense of the hypnotized subject having no memory of either their hypnotization or their subsequent activity, as a direct consequence of the hypnotist's suggestions.
|
||||
|
||||
"Besides doing successful work in economics, [Professor Jules Liégeois] has put both psychologists and jurists in his debt by his pioneer studies of hypnotism and suggestion in their medico-legal aspects." — The American Journal of Psychology (January 1910).
|
||||
|
||||
== Family ==
|
||||
The son of Joseph-Martin Liégeois (1797-1854), a forester, and Anne-Rosalie Liégeois (1810-1890), née Tabutiaux, Jules Joseph Liégeois was born at Damvillers, Meuse, France on 30 November 1833.
|
||||
He married Hélène Marie Henriette Peiffer (1842-1935) in Nancy on 25 September 1867; they had two children: Marie Marguerite Liégeois (1868-1897), who married the linguist and philologist Ferdinand Brunot in 1891, and Jules Albert Liégeois (1875-1930), who went on to become an examining magistrate in Évreux.
|
||||
|
||||
== Academic career ==
|
||||
His first employment was in various administrative roles — first, in the Meuse Department, at Bar-le-Duc (1851 to 1854), and then in the Meurthe Department, at Nancy (1854 to 1863) — and it was not until he was in his late 20s that he began formal legal studies at Strasbourg (there was no University in Nancy at that time).
|
||||
Having successfully submitted his bachelor's degree dissertation, Du prêt à intérêt en droit romain et en droit français ('Interest-bearing loans in Roman law and French law'), at the University of Strasbourg's Faculty of Law and Political Science in 1861, he went on to defend his doctoral dissertation, Essai sur l'histoire et la legislation de l'usure ('Essay on the History and Legislation of Usury'), at Strasbourg in 1863.
|
||||
Personally appointed directly by Victor Duruy, the French Minister of Public Education (1863-1869), in October 1865, he served as professor of administrative law (as distinct from civil and criminal law) at Nancy University from the University's re-establishment in 1865 until his retirement in 1904, when he became an honorary professor.
|
||||
He published widely upon important matters of public and administrative law — including two important works (1873b, 1882b), jointly written with Louis Pierre Cabantous (1812-1872), Professor of Administrative Law, and Dean of the Faculty, at Aix-Marseille University — and on political economy and the relationship between economics and public law, many of which displayed the influence of the economic theories of Frédéric Bastiat: e.g. 1858; 1861; 1863; 1865; 1867; 1873a; 1873b; 1873c; 1877; 1878; 1879; 1881a; 1881b; 1882a; 1882b; 1882c; 1883, and 1890a.
|
||||
|
||||
== The two French "Schools" of hypnotism (1882–1892) ==
|
||||
It is significant that neither the "Salpêtrière School" (a.k.a. the "Paris School"), or "Hysteria School", nor the "Nancy School", or "Suggestion School", as they are widely known, were "Schools" in the classical sense; neither, for instance, had an undisputed "master". However, as Mathieu Touzeil-Divina (2024a) observes, whilst the members of each group displayed as many differences of approach between themselves as points of agreement (that is, apart from the Nancy School's agreed-upon views on hypnotism and suggestion, and their opposition to the views of Charcot and the Salpêtrière School), it is still useful to speak of the two groups as competing "schools of thought", on the basis that the members of each group shared entirely different geographic, thematic, and chronological linkages from those that were shared by the members of the other group; and, also, all the research and experimentation of each was conducted entirely independent of the other.
|
||||
Peter (2024, p. 6) draws attention to the fact that, despite all of the subject-centred research conducted by a wide range of researchers with a wide range of theoretical orientations and disciplinary allegiances in the last 150 years into "[what] has always been regarded as a hallmark of hypnosis" — namely, "a non-judgemental, involuntary acceptance of suggestions", which, "[when] seen as a negative characteristic" is "a loss of control" — the question of "whether such a suggestive-hypnotically induced loss of control is also possible in normal everyday life, [and] whether the hypnotized person is then helplessly at the mercy of the hypnotist" has never been unequivocally settled.
|
||||
|
||||
=== "Hypnotism" and "hypnosis" ===
|
||||
There is no objective evidence of any kind that the various allusions made by either of the Schools to "somnambulism", "artificial somnambulism", "hypnotism", or "hypnosis" were, in fact, speaking of the same psychological circumstances and physiological arrangements; and, so, the two may well have been "talking past each other", rather than engaging in an actual dispute.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Imagination ===
|
||||
35
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Liégeois-1.md
Normal file
35
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Liégeois-1.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Jules Liégeois"
|
||||
chunk: 2/7
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jules_Liégeois"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:26.427074+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
At the time of their (1784) inquiries, the two Royal Commissions on Animal Magnetism — one was from the Paris Faculty of Medicine) and the French Royal Academy of Sciences (i.e., Bailly, 1784a; 1800; 1784b), and the other from the Royal Society of Medicine of Paris (i.e., Poissonnier, et al., 1784) — independently and emphatically concluded from their controlled trials and "blind" experiments that the (metaphysical) claims made by Mesmer's former associate, Charles d’Eslon, for the substantial existence of "animal magnetism" (le magnétisme animal) and of a substantial (rather than metaphorical) "magnetic fluid" (le fluide magnétique) were nothing more than a case (as Mesmer himself had argued) of the inappropriate reification of metaphor (i.e, Alfred Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness"), and were, therefore, entirely without foundation.
|
||||
|
||||
==== Dominant ideas ====
|
||||
Anticipating the (c.1820) work of Thomas Brown, the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh University, James Braid's teacher, in relation to the suggestive influence of "dominant ideas", and the work of Braid himself, in relation to the "mono-ideo-dynamic principle of action" concept (Braid, 1855) that he had developed from the work of his associates William Benjamin Carpenter, and Daniel Noble, both of the (1784) investigatory committees concluded that — having excluded any potential influence from either contact, or imitation — all of the observed phenomena could be attributed to the psycho-physiological agency of imagination.
|
||||
|
||||
==== Suggestion ====
|
||||
It is significant that, a century later, and despite their significant differences in relation to "hypnotism", "hypnosis" etc. (see below), both Charcot (Salpêtrière School) and Bernheim (Nancy School) were united in their overall interest in "suggestion".
|
||||
|
||||
==== "Miracles" ====
|
||||
Both Schools were entirely convinced that the so-called "miracles" — i.e., "counter-intuitive events" attributed to "counterintuitive agents" (Pyysiäinen, 2002) — reported to have taken place at Lourdes were entirely attributable to each individual pilgrim's "imagination" (see Charcot, 1892; and Bernheim, 1889, pp. 196-202); and, as well, as Charcot noted (1893, p.31), "the faith-cure demands special subjects and special complaints — those, namely, which are amenable to the influence of the mind over the body". In a similar vein, Beaunis, of the Nancy School, replicated the earlier work of Prof. Henri Bourru (1840-1914) and M. Prosper Ferdinand Burot (1849-1921) of the School of Naval Medicine, at Rochefort, in producing "stigmata" per medium of "suggestion" (Liégeois 1889a, pp. 294-299).
|
||||
|
||||
=== "Hysteria School of Hypnosis" at the Salpêtrière, Paris (fl.1878–1893) ===
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
"At the very outset my studies dealt with hysterical women, and ever since I have always employed hysterical subjects. ... [and] I have chosen rather to deal almost always with the female sex, because females are more sensitive and more manageable than males in the hypnotic state." — Jean-Martin Charcot (January 1890).
|
||||
"[Unlike Liébeault and Bernheim] Charcot never personally hypnotized any subject. The younger physicians worked with the subjects, and Charcot used them as demonstration subjects after they had learned what was expected of them and had seen other subjects perform. They were unwittingly trained by the physicians and by each other." — Frank Pattie (1967).
|
||||
"One point that to me appears to be established by incontestable observations, is that the persons, whether men or women, who are susceptible of hypnotization, are nervous creatures, capable of becoming hysterical, if not actually hysterical at the beginning of the experiments. ... The training of the subjects is no easy thing and takes time; and besides, fit subjects are by no means so plentiful as some authors would have us believe." — Jean-Martin Charcot (April 1890).
|
||||
The "Hysteria School", or "Salpêtrière School", was centred on the theories and practices of Jean-Martin Charcot, a neurologist at the Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris. The procedures were used upon a very small, limited number of the female "hysteria" inpatients of the Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital — i.e., as "hysteria" was understood at the time.
|
||||
Members of the school held — given that its experimental subjects were all "hysteria" patients, perhaps mistaking correlation for causation — that "hypnosis" was an artificially produced pathological state similar to hysteria. From this, they also argued that, given the pathological nature of the hypnotic state, only medical/neurological professionals had the expertise required to avoid the potential dangers of its application: viz., that of "violently unleashing pathological states in persons of labile disposition" (Mayer, 2013, p. 104). The means of induction employed by Charcot's assistants included those derived from Braid's upwards and inwards squint, as well as wide range of auditory and tactile stimuli:
|
||||
|
||||
"[In relation to the means of hypnotization] Charcot's school at La Salpetiere has modified the Braid method, by placing pieces of glass close to the bridge of the nose, by which procedure the convergency of the eyes is increased and sleep comes more rapidly. A blow on a gong or a pressure on some "hypnogenic or hysterogenic" zone — such as an ovary, the top of the head, etc. (see: The "zones" of Albert Pitres) — or the app[r]oaching of a magnet will act on hysterical women." — Fredrik Johan Björnström (1887).
|
||||
|
||||
=== "Suggestion School of Hypnosis" at Nancy (fl.1864—1907) ===
|
||||
|
||||
Inspired by the theories and practices of the Nancy physician and medical hypnotist, Ambroise-Auguste Liébeault (1823–1904), who had already been independently working with hypnotism and "suggestion" for twenty-five years — delivering his hypnotic treatments to all and sundry free of charge — and united by their opposition to the "hysteria", views of Charcot and his followers at the Salpêtrière, those in the "Suggestion School" collectively held that (i) "hypnosis" was a state similar to sleep, (ii) it was not a diagnostic feature of "hysteria", (iii) it was produced by suggestion, (iv) that the capacity to be "hypnotized" was a normal, natural (and non-pathogenic) ability shared by all, and (v) that the well-attested efficacy of "suggestion", on its own, was significantly enhanced by "hypnotism".
|
||||
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|
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"The hypnotic condition is not an abnormal one, it does not create new functions nor extraordinary phenomena; it develops those which are produced in the waking condition; because of a new psychical modality, it exaggerates the normal susceptibility to suggestion, which we all possess to some extent; our psychical condition is modified so as to carry out the images and impressions evoked with greater boldness and distinctness." — Hippolyte Bernheim (1888).
|
||||
"Hypnotism, like natural sleep, exalts the imagination, and makes the brain more susceptible to suggestion. ... It is a physiological law, that sleep puts the brain into such a psychical condition that the imagination accepts and recognizes as real the impressions transmitted to it. To provoke this special psychical condition by means of hypnotism, and to cultivate the suggestibility thus artificially increased with the aim of cure or relief, this is the role of psychotherapeutics." — Hippolyte Bernheim (1888, emphasis in original).
|
||||
Of the foundation members of "Suggestion School" — Prof. Jules Liégeois (faculty of Law), Prof. Hippolyte Bernheim (1840–1919) (faculty of Medicine), and Prof. Henri-Étienne Beaunis (1830–1921) (chair of Physiology), from the University of Nancy — the first to associate himself with the experiments, principles, and practices of Liébeault was the legal expert, Liégeois, "who had learned of Liébeault's practices by chance, and whose scientific curiosity had led him there", then, somewhat later, came the (initially sceptical) neurologist and physician, Bernheim, who had also learned of Liébeault's practices by chance, and, finally, initially persuaded by Bernheim, came the physiologist Beaunis, who had held the chair of Physiology at Nancy University ever since the University had moved from Strasbourg to Nancy in 1872.
|
||||
In addition to their extensive personal experience of the successful hypnotization of a wide range of subjects in a wide range of circumstances, and their practical and theoretical studies of the phenomena of hypnotism and hypnotic suggestion in general, the members of the Nancy School also investigated the medical and legal aspects of their application: with Berheim concentrating on their therapeutic aspects, Liégeois on their (civil and criminal) legal aspects, and Beaunis on their physiological and psychological aspects.
|
||||
|
||||
== Liégeois, hypnotism and suggestion ==
|
||||
|
||||
"In this initial period ... Liégeois [rather than Bernheim] was the early worker, the most steadfast, the most militant, the most convinced [by Liébeault's work and "new method"]. He brought to the common cause the support of his moral authority, his character, his robust and active faith, which never wavered for a moment, and thanks to him, criminal legislation had to recognize and would increasingly deal with the phenomena of hypnotism and suggestion." — Henri-Étienne Beaunis (1909).
|
||||
"Professor Liégeois's career ... is well known. I will confine myself to proclaiming, once again, that he was a true initiator. He was, in fact, the first to address the study of the relationship between hypnotism and law and jurisprudence. His studies were pushed so far in this direction that his name dominates the entire forensic study of hypnotism. It was in this capacity that he was called to the first international congress on hypnotism, in 1889, through his position as vice-president, to represent the legal experts. At the second congress, in 1900, he shared this honour with Mr. [Edmond] Melcot, Attorney General at the Court of Cassation ... [Admired for] his courage, energy, generosity, firmness in his carefully considered opinions, and consistency in his friendships ... his name will remain, in the history of hypnotism and psychology, indissolubly linked to that of Liébeault, with whom he was a faithful collaborator and to whom he brought, until the end, the comfort of his friendship." — Edgar Bérillion (1910).
|
||||
The issue of Liégeois' ("outlier") non-medical profession was constantly raised in the ad hominem attacks made over the years by those seeking to belittle his research, theories, and influence; for instance, in his (1889) response to Liégeois' presentation, on the dangers of criminal suggestions, to the First International Congress of Experimental and Therapeutic Hypnotism (Liégeois, 1889b), Georges Gilles de la Tourette, expressed his disappointment (p. 264) that Liégeois, a Professor of Law, had not confined his presentation to the legal issues of the relationship between hypnotism and jurisprudence/forensic medicine, and had chosen, instead, to speak of a wide range of medical and physiological aspects of hypnotism.
|
||||
However, despite being neither medical practitioner nor neurologist, Liégeois was far better known than Bernheim, or Beaunis, or Liébeault at the time of his five (April/May 1884) lectures to the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences on hypnotism, suggestion, and crime, and their subsequent publication (Liégeois, 1884). He was also becoming increasingly recognized as a significant French authority on hypnotism and hypnotic suggestion; for instance, by August 1884 Le Monde illustré was referring to Liégeois as "the esteemed hypnotizing professor" ("L'estimable professeur hypnotisant").
|
||||
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|
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|
||||
|
||||
=== "Waking" and "hypnotic" suggestion ===
|
||||
Although Liégeois' initial experiments reflected his academic interest in the legal parallels between hypnotism and natural/spontaneous (i.e., rather than "mesmeric" or "artificially induced") somnambulism, his major work over an extended period involved a thorough investigation into the principles and practices responsible for a far wider range of applications of "suggestion" — involving both 'waking' suggestion and 'hypnotic' suggestion — than their medical and/or therapeutic applications alone.
|
||||
In particular, given his forensic interest in the effects of "suggestion" and their significance in relation to issues of posthypnotic amnesia, and the personal responsibility/culpability for the phenomena produced by "suggestion", he was also deeply interested in the nature, form, and content of the "suggestions" made. Driven by his concern with the philosophical and forensic (rather than therapeutic) aspects of hypnotism and hypnotic suggestion, Liégeois asserted, along with Charcot's associate Pierre Janet (1920, pp.284–285), that the critical feature of the subject-operator interaction was not the operator's making of the "suggestion", but, instead, was the subject's taking of the "suggestion" made by the operator. As Yeates (2016a) observed, in the same way that "one is only a "hypnotist" if one induces "hypnotism" ... an idea is only a "suggestion" if it "suggests" something"(p. 35); and as Titchener (1910, p 450) noted, without knowing the subsequent response to its presentation, there is no objective a priori difference between a "suggestive idea" and any other idea; and, from this, Titchener argued, "suggestion" can not be a (before the yet-to-be performed event) "descriptive" term, but is only a (subsequent to the reactive event's occurrence) "explanatory" term.
|
||||
Among the wide range of experiments Liégeois conducted, his subjects displayed responses to suggestions made at a distance in time (1886e) and at a distance in space (1886b, 1886c). He confirmed (1886e) the existence of what Berhheim described as les suggestions post hypnotiques à longue échéance ('post-hypnotic suggestions to be realised after a long interval'), when one of his subjects demonstrated a suggested result precisely 365 days (as demanded by Liégeois) after the relevant hypnotic suggestion had been delivered. He also demonstrated that subjects (i) could be hypnotised, and (ii) would respond to suggestions delivered to them over the telephone: and, in his report (1886b, p. 142; 1886c, p. 24), Liégeois also supposed that a similar outcome might be achieved by a phonograph recording.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Hallucinations ===
|
||||
The work of French alienist Jacques-Joseph Moreau's (1845) Du Hachisch et de l'aliénation mentale — which spoke of the hallucinations induced by drugs (e.g., opium, hashish) in otherwise "normal" people — had begun to shift disciplinary consciousness away from the view that, "because hallucination was a verifiable feature of the behaviour of the insane, the phenomenon must in itself be pathological" (Finn, 2017, p. 22), towards one that accepted that a capacity to experience hallucination was a feature of an entirely normal "existence intérieure" ('inner/subjective existence') and an entirely normal "vie intrà-cérébrale" ('intracerebral life'):
|
||||
|
||||
"The hallucination ... encompasses all of the faculties of the mind; its only limits are those that nature has placed upon the activity of mental functions. In other words, all mental abilities can be hallucinated, and not just certain abilities, such as those connected with the perception, for example, of sounds or images." — Jacques-Joseph Moreau (1845).
|
||||
Liégeois devoted an entire chapter of his 1889 work to the experiences of himself and others in relation to those hallucinations induced by hypnotic suggestion; namely, both:
|
||||
|
||||
(a) "hallucinations positives", perception of some thing as being present in the absence of any related external stimulus; and
|
||||
(b) "hallucinations négatives", perception of some thing as absent in the actual presence of a specific, related external stimulus: i.e., the rationale behind the modern processes of hypnotic pain management.
|
||||
|
||||
== Liégeois, hypnotism and crime ==
|
||||
As an academic and jurist Liégeois was interested in "the subject of personality modification and its implications in law" (Marchetti, 2015, p. 81) and, in particular, the legal questions raised in relation to "culpability", for instance, in the case of M. Emile X—, as it had been observed by Adrien Proust (father of Marcel Proust) the Inspector-General of the French Government Sanitary Service, and had been reported in the French press, "as to the possibility of anyone exercising such an influence over another person as to make him or her irresponsible for the acts committed under that influence, even though those acts may be crimes". Liégeois was especially interested in the extent to which it was possible that (otherwise innocent) subjects could be induced, by means of hypnotic suggestion, to commit crimes, thefts, and even murders. Gauld (1992, p.497) characterizes these events as "hypnotic crimes": namely, crimes wherein the hypnotic subject was both the "victim" and the "agent" of the crime — with the suggestion-delivering operator, rather than the suggestion-complying subject, being the actual "criminal". As Harris (1985, p. 486) notes, this view produced "unresolved tensions and ambiguities", because the Nancy School, "on the one hand [was] arguing that hypnotism had enormous potential to ameliorate previously intractable conditions, and on the other [was] regarding it as the possible motor for the committal of unspeakable crimes".
|
||||
24
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|
||||
|
||||
"[In the mid-1880s, in addition to concerns relating to the possibility] of rape under hypnotic sleep ... another type of moral concern associated with hypnotism was gaining public attention abroad: the possibility of inciting people under hypnosis to commit criminal acts. It was Jules Liégeois, the French lawyer associated with the Nancy School of hypnotism, who in 1884 first pointed to this danger in a report for the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences." — Kaat Wils (2017).
|
||||
Liégeois' own experiments, relating to both serious and petty crimes, which employed a wide range of suggested "mock" activities involving fake weapons, fake poisons, etc. — i.e., "crimes expérimentaux" ('experimental crimes'), or "crimes de laboratoire" ('laboratory crimes), in place of "crimes véritable" ('real crimes') — was work for which he was much admired by the experimental psychologist, Joseph Delbœuf (e.g., Delbœuf, 1892), and much denigrated by Charcot's associate, Georges Gilles de la Tourette (e.g., Gilles de la Tourette, 1891b). However, as Bogousslavsky, Walusinski & Veyrunes (2009, pp. 197-198) observe, Gilles de la Tourette's criticism was somewhat unfair: not only had Gilles de la Tourette (some time earlier) personally conducted similar "hypnotic murder" experiments involving fake pistols and mock poisons at the Salpêtrière, but he had also reported them in detail in his 1887 work.
|
||||
Notwithstanding the obvious fact that individuals, subjected to extended processes of incremental (non-hypnotic) suggestion, can be induced to self-harm (e.g., Peoples Temple suicides in Guyana in 1978, Heaven's Gate suicides in California in 1997, etc.) or coerced to commit a crime, most advocates of "hypnotic crimes" also recognized that the successful demonstration of an "experimental crime" did not, in and of itself, provide sufficient proof of the possible existence of an analogous "real crime"; for instance:
|
||||
|
||||
"It may be set down as an axiom in experimental hypnotism that no laboratory experiment conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether suggestion can be successfully employed to induce an hypnotic subject to perpetrate a crime is of any evidential value whatever. When a subject is hypnotized for that purpose he knows that he is among friends. He knows that they are law-abiding citizens who will take care that no harm shall result from the experiments about to be made. He generally knows that he is expected to carry out all suggestions that are made to him. He is very probably aware that he is expected to demonstrate the truth of the proposition that a criminal hypnotist can compel his subject to commit crime. Like all hypnotic subjects he is anxious to win applause — to create astonishment. In short, he knows that he is the central figure in a comedy or farce which is about to be played in the interests of "science", and he feels that he is the "scientist". The inevitable consequence is that he resolves to carry out every suggestion of the hypnotist, knowing that no harm can possibly result." — Thomson Jay Hudson, LL.D., Ph.D., (1895, emphasis in original)
|
||||
Liégeois' investigations culminated in his (1889a) magnum opus, "On suggestion and somnambulism in their relation to jurisprudence and legal medicine" — based upon the experience and observations he had accumulated since his earlier, five full-session presentation to the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in April and May 1884 (Liégeois, 1884) — which concentrated in great detail upon the legal implications of hypnotism, hypnotic phenomena, and hypnotic suggestion, arguing that, in cases of hypnotic crime, only the person who gave the suggestions was guilty and must be prosecuted and punished, whilst the (irresponsible) hypnotised person should be acquitted on the grounds that they were nothing more than "a simple instrument", just like the pistol that contains a bullet, or a vase that contains poison: however, as Laurence & Perry (1988) observe, it must be stressed that those within the Nancy School "did not believe that everyone could fall victim of criminal suggestion", and held the view that "only deeply hypnotizable subjects ... were generally at risk".
|
||||
|
||||
== Gabrielle Bompard ==
|
||||
|
||||
"There can be no crime, or delict, where the accused was in a state of madness, at the time of the action; or when he has been constrained by a force which he had not the power to resist." — Article 64: French Penal Code of 1810.
|
||||
In December 1890, Michel Eyraud, aged 47, and Gabrielle Bompard, aged 21, were jointly tried in Paris for the (July 1899) murder of Toussaint-Augustin Gouffé — "the prosecution's case was that Bompard, in association with her middle-aged lover Michel Eyraud, had willingly allowed herself to be used as a sexual bait to lure Alexandre-Toussaint Gouffé to a flat in the 8th arrondissement, where the two then hanged and robbed their victim" (Harris, 1985, p. 477). The sensational trial was of international interest. The Times, for instance, published an extensive and detailed account of each of the trial's five sessions for its English readers, with coverage from Dalziel's News Agency, along with additional comments by "Our own correspondent", as well as a strongly critical editorial commentary at the trial's completion.
|
||||
Eyraud's guilt had soon been established (by his own admission); and, so, the remainder of the trial was entirely concerned with the part played by Bompard. Maitre Henri-Robert, Bompard's advocate, argued that she had been hypnotized by Eyraud, her co-accused; and therefore, as Eyraud's involuntary accomplice, she could not be held responsible for Gouffé’s murder:
|
||||
|
||||
"The chief point at issue, however, was the degree of responsibility of Bompard, and whether there were sufficient grounds for believing that the series of complicated acts involved in the crime could be performed under hypnotic suggestion." — The Lancet, 3 January 1891.
|
||||
34
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|
||||
|
||||
=== Prosecution ===
|
||||
The two expert witnesses for the prosecution, Paul Brouardel, the eminent professor of forensics at the Faculté de Médecine de Paris, and Gilbert Ballet, Charcot's chef de clinique ('clinical head') at the Salpêtrière, gave evidence that, in their view, any such thing was impossible; and in an extensive (later) discussion of the matter, Georges Gilles de La Tourette, a former pupil of Brouardel and close associate of Charcot, published an extensive account of the matter (i.e., 1891a, and 1891b), "which denied all possibility of a violent act under hypnosis and by suggestion" (Walusinski, 2011, p. 76).
|
||||
|
||||
=== Defence ===
|
||||
Called upon as an expert witness for Bompard's defence as a representative of the Nancy School, Liégeois produced extensive details of the numerous experiments that had satisfied both himself and his Nancy colleagues that crimes could be committed by (innocent) subjects under the influence of hypnotic suggestion. His constant emphasis throughout his testimony that both he and Bernheim held the same opinions is easily explained: Liégeois was a last-minute substitute for Bernheim — and was, therefore, only present as a proxy for Bernheim, rather than as Liégeois, the legal expert who had addressed the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in April and May 1884 (i.e., Liégeois, 1884).
|
||||
Noting that ever since 1888, in relation to the "theories of Nancy", Bernheim had theorised "from the physiological point of view", whilst he (Liégeois) had theorised from the "moral and judicial sense", Liégeois delivered a four-hour (uninterrupted) opinion as an expert witness:
|
||||
|
||||
"Dr. Liégeois of Nancy gave evidence at great length regarding the hypnotic theory put forward by Bompard and her counsel. He stated that he and his colleague, Dr. Bernheim, found that in a state of profound hypnotism there was a complete absence of will in the subject, and that any suggestion made by the hypnotiser passes into the subject and inspires him or her to action. He gave instances of hypnotic subjects being excited to commit thefts, to fire a pistol at a friend, &c. As regards the present case, he thought there was reason to believe that Bompard might have acted under hypnotic suggestion. The fact of her having passed the whole night near the body of a man who had been murdered suggested that she was under some secret influence. In view of the proofs given that she was readily hypnotisable, and his conviction that it was possible for Eyraud to have hypnotised her to act as his accomplice, he thought the jury could not ignore this theory." — The Lancet, 3 January 1891.
|
||||
In his address to the court, Liégeois stated that his numerous experiments had satisfied both Bernheim and himself that, "in a state of profound somnambulism or hypnotism there is a complete absence of will in the subject, and that any suggestion by the hypnotiser passes into the subject, and inspires him or her to actions". On the grounds that "he considered it possible that she might have received suggestions of which she did not retain any recollection when she was awake", Liégeois complained that he had been refused pre-trial access to Bompard, hoping to hypnotize her "to see to what degree she was open to hypnotic suggestion" and, also, "in order to revive her recollection of the facts which occurred at the moment of the commission of the crime".
|
||||
|
||||
=== Verdict ===
|
||||
Although found guilty, Bompard was not sentenced to death, but was sentenced to 20 years in prison with hard labour, due to what were considered to be "extenuating circumstances". Her accomplice, Eyraud, found "Guilty without extenuating circumstances", was executed by guillotine on 3 February 1891. Bompard was released from prison ten years later, in January 1901, "on account of her good conduct while in prison"; and, three years later, in June 1903, she was pardoned.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Demonstration of hypnotic influence (1903) ===
|
||||
|
||||
In late 1903, following a request from her 1889 trial advocate, Maitre Henri-Robert, Liégeois conducted various experiments upon Gabrielle Bompard "in order to prove that she had committed the, crime while under the hypnotic influence of Eyraud, a theory [that Henri-Robert had] advanced unsuccessfully at the trial". As result of his experiments, "an officer of the Department of Justice, who was present at the seance ... [said that he was convinced that in] the case of Gabrielle Bompard [there was a] genuine hypnotic irresponsibility of crime".
|
||||
|
||||
"Professor Liegeois ... [who] says that he has never met with so easy a [hypnotic] subject ... is convinced [from his experiments] that the woman was compelled to participate in the crime while under hypnotic influence ... [and] that there was a gross miscarriage of justice in condemning such a person for acts for which she was wholly irresponsible, and [he] intends reporting the results of his investigations to the Academy of Medicine." — Press report from London, 11 December 1903.
|
||||
|
||||
== Death ==
|
||||
Jules Liégeois died when "he was run over and killed by a motor car before the eyes of his wife, with whom he was walking on a quiet country road" in the thermal spa town of Bains-les-Bains on 14 August 1908.
|
||||
|
||||
== Recognition ==
|
||||
Liégeois was highly regarded in his lifetime for his contributions to public and administrative law, and to political economy; and, despite not being a medical practitioner, he was widely respected for the rigorous nature of the investigations he conducted into the theory, practice, applications, and efficacy of hypnotic suggestion in general, and for the expert opinions he published on hypnotism and crime in particular.
|
||||
58
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|
||||
|
||||
1863: admitted as an Associate Member of the Académie de Stanislas on 23 January 1863.
|
||||
1874: admitted as a Full Member of the Académie de Stanislas on 27 March 1874.
|
||||
1881: admitted as a Full Member of the Society of Comparative Legislation in May 1881.
|
||||
1881-1882: served as President of the Académie de Stanislas.
|
||||
1886: made a Corresponding Member of the Society for Psychical Research.
|
||||
1889: appointed vice-president of the First International Congress of Experimental and Therapeutic Hypnotism, in Paris, in August 1889.
|
||||
c.1890: made an Honorary Member of the Gesellschaft Für Psychologische Forschung ('Society for Psychological Research').
|
||||
1892: appointed vice-president of the Second International Congress of Experimental Psychology, in London, in August 1892.
|
||||
1897: appointed Honorary President of the International Congress of Neurology, Psychiatry, Medical Electricity, and Hypnology, in Brussels, in 1897.
|
||||
1899: made a Corresponding Member of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, the organization to which he had made a significant presentation in 1884.
|
||||
1900: appointed vice-president of the Second International Congress of Experimental and Therapeutic Hypnotism, in Paris, in August 1900.
|
||||
1904: made a Chevalier (Knight) of the Légion d'honneur (Legion of Honour), by decree, on 26 July 1904.
|
||||
|
||||
== Memorials ==
|
||||
|
||||
=== Bains-les-Bains (1909) ===
|
||||
|
||||
A bronze bust of Jules Liégeois, created by the Nancy ceramist and sculptor Ernest Bussière (1863-1913) — a member of the other "Nancy School", the École de Nancy founded by the Art Nouveau artist and designer Émile Gallé — was erected on a granite pedestal designed by the architect Louis-Ernest Mougenot (1862-1929), and was unveiled on 22 August 1909, in the park of the thermal establishment at which Liégeois had been a regular spa guest. The monument was raised by international subscription.
|
||||
|
||||
As well as his widow and son representing the Liégeois family, the unveiling was attended by Professor Gaston Floquet of the Science Faculty at Nancy University and vice-president of its Council; Dr. Auguste Mathieu, Director of the thermal spa; Dr. Faivre d'Arcier, of the spa's medical staff; and Professor Edgar Bérillon of l’École de Psychologie in Paris. A last minute change in the date of the unveiling meant that a number of those who intended to be there were unable to attend.
|
||||
Several of those who could attend also made speeches: Professor Gaston Floquet, from Nancy's Science Faculty; Dr. Albert van Renterghem (1845-1939), of Amsterdam, President of the monument's International Subscription Committee; Prof. Henri-Étienne Beaunis, the Nancy colleague of Liégeois; Louis Monal, President of the spa's Administrative Council; Professor Edgar Bérillon, Secretary-General of the Société d'hypnologie et de psychologie; Albert Bonjean (1858-1939), an Advocate from Verviers, Belgium and Secretary to the monument's International Subscription Committee; and Prof. Hippolyte Bernheim, the Nancy colleague of Liégeois.
|
||||
The inscription on the front of the pedestal, "À Liegeois 1833—1908 Souscription Internationale de Medecins Jurisconsultes et Philosophes", indicates that the international subscriptions had come from the medical, legal, and philosophical professions. The inscription on the left-hand side of the pedestal reads "Fut un des fondateurs de l'Ecole Nancy Hypnotisme" ('Was one of the founders of the Nancy School of Hypnotism').
|
||||
|
||||
=== Damvillers (1909) ===
|
||||
|
||||
A bronze bust of Jules Liégeois, also by Bussière, was erected upon a granite pedestal in the public square of Damvillers, and unveiled on 24 October 1909. Also raised by international subscription.
|
||||
|
||||
As well as his widow and son representing the Liégeois family, the unveiling was attended by a large number of influential political, legal, and scientific figures: including Albert Lefébure, MP for Meuse; Charles Humbert, Senator for Meuse; Charles Aubert, the Prefect of Meuse, Raoul Catusse, Sub-Prefect of Montmédy; Dr. Edgar Berillon (of Paris), and Dr. Crispulo Diaz (of Puerto Rico), representing the Société d'hypnologie et de psychologie; Georges Jules Guilhermet, Advocate at the Paris Court, representing the 'Ecole de psychologie; Alfred Pierrot, Secretary to the monument's International Subscription Committee, and publisher of Journal de Montmédy; Prof. Ferdinand Brunot, of the Sorbonne; Captain Lallemand, of the 147th Infantry Regiment; Dr. Charles Ernest Maillard, General Councillor of Danville; Gustave Herbillon, District Councillor of Danville (as Liégeois had also been from 1867 to 1871); the painter and architect, Émile Bastien-Lepage; and Jules Constant Bergeron, the Forest Inspector at Montmédy.
|
||||
Following a reception in the Damvillers Town Hall, a number of speeches were delivered, with those who had spoken at Bains-les-Bains (‡) repeating their address: Dr. Dr. Albert van Renterghem (‡), of Amsterdam, President of the International Subscription Committee; Alfred Pierrot, Secretary to the International Subscription Committee and publisher of Journal de Montmédy; Paul Lalondrelle, Mayor of Damvillers; Albert Bonjean (‡), Belgian Advocate and Secretary to the International Subscription Committee; Prof. Charles Lyon-Caen, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Paris and Member of the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques; Georges Jules Guilhermet, Advocate (of the Paris Court), representing l'Ecole de psychologie; Professor Edgar Bérillon (‡), Secretary-General of the Société d'hypnologie et de psychologie; Dr. Charles Ernest Maillard, General Councillor of Danville; Albert Lefébure, MP for Meuse; and Charles Humbert, Senator for Meuse.
|
||||
The same inscription on the front of the pedestal, "À Liegeois 1833—1908 Souscription Internationale de Medecins Jurisconsultes et Philosophes", as that at Bains-les-Bains. The inscription on the right-hand side of the pedestal reads "À découvert les rapports de l'hypnotisme et de la suggestion avec le droit et la médecine légale" ('Discovered the connections between hypnotism and suggestion and law and forensic medicine').
|
||||
The bronze bust was removed and melted down by the Germans during their First World War occupation of Damvillers. A replica cast iron bust was re-installed in Danvillers in 1997.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Nancy (1909) ===
|
||||
A plaster version of the same bust, by Bussière, is on display in the reception rooms of the Faculty of Law at Nancy University.
|
||||
|
||||
== See also ==
|
||||
|
||||
== Notes ==
|
||||
|
||||
== References ==
|
||||
|
||||
=== Jules Liégeois ===
|
||||
|
||||
=== Others ===
|
||||
|
||||
== External links ==
|
||||
Jules Joseph Liégeois, Notice no.L1639026, at France Archives.
|
||||
Jules Joseph Liégeois, at Comité des travaux historiques et scientifique.
|
||||
49
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_psychology-0.md
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49
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_psychology-0.md
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@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Legal psychology"
|
||||
chunk: 1/3
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_psychology"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:25.069000+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Legal psychology is a field focused on the application of psychological principles within the legal system and its interactions with individuals. Professionals in this area are involved in understanding, assessing, evaluating potential jurors, investigating crimes and crime scenes, conducting forensic investigations The term "legal psychology" distinguishes this practical branch of psychology from the more theory-oriented field of clinical psychology.
|
||||
Together, legal psychology and forensic psychology form the field more generally recognized as "psychology and law". Following earlier efforts by psychologists to address legal issues, psychology and law became a field of study in the 1960s, though that originating concern has lessened over time. The multidisciplinary American Psychological Association's Division 41, the American Psychology–Law Society, is active with the goal of promoting the contributions of psychology to the understanding of law and legal systems through research; as well as providing education to psychologists in legal issues and providing education to legal personnel on psychological issues. Further, its mandate is to inform the psychological and legal communities, along with the general public, about current research, education, and services in the field of psychology and law. There are similar societies in Canada, Britain, and Europe.
|
||||
The Canadian Psychological Association also serves as a multidisciplinary hub for psychologists and researchers to connect. Its annual conferences, held across Canada, promote new research and foster collaboration.
|
||||
|
||||
== Training and education ==
|
||||
Legal psychologists typically hold a PhD in some area of psychology (e.g., clinical psychology, social psychology, or cognitive psychology), and apply their knowledge of that field to the law. Although formal legal training (such as a JD or Master of Legal Studies degree) can be beneficial, most legal psychologists hold only the PhD. Based on the annual updates to the American Psychology and Law Society’s (APLS) official resources, there has been an increase in the number of universities which offer specialized training in legal psychology.
|
||||
|
||||
== Legal vs. forensic psychology ==
|
||||
For a time, all areas of law which applied psychological information were generally considered under the umbrella of legal psychology. Over time the field expanded so much that different areas of legal psychology had to be defined. Now, legal psychology is considered to refer to the application of research to law enforcement and the justice system to inform its officers of new research, to develop more evidence-based procedures, and to conduct quality assessments of offender programs.
|
||||
Forensic psychology has developed into its own field which focuses on the offenders and victims of the crime in question. Traditionally, forensic psychology is based in clinical psychology and focuses on the assessment of mental illness, competency, and Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD)/insanity defense. It has been thought that in America psychologists have been used as expert witnesses in court testimonies since the early 1920s. However, it was expected that only a medical doctor would have the expertise to assess and diagnose an individual with incompetency to stand trial or accept a sentence. While the field has widened, this is still generally the case.
|
||||
Forensic psychological studies in the social psychological explanations for crime and offender motivations have led to the development of (evidence-based) offender profiling. The profiling of criminals, and its application, are not new concepts. Since the 1700s the studies of phrenology have attempted to track physical or behavioural actions to brain functioning and personality traits. This practice was very popular (despite its flaws and racist tendencies) and remains popular as shown by its presence in media, (i.e., tv shows like Criminal minds). The benefit of evidence-based practices helps ensure that bias and interpersonal connections do not influence whom law enforcement views as a threat to community safety.
|
||||
Recent academic programs for legal psychology have combined the application of research to existing structures and moved away from only allowing clinical psychologists to speak as experts in forensic psychological matters as researchers have also become experts in their fields.
|
||||
|
||||
== Areas of research ==
|
||||
Any research that combines psychological principles with legal applications or contexts could be considered legal psychology.
|
||||
Common areas of research in legal psychology include (but are not limited to),
|
||||
|
||||
Understanding Jury decision making
|
||||
Understanding Judges’ decision making
|
||||
Testing the validity of eyewitness statements and identifications
|
||||
Understanding the motivations and obstacles faced by offenders
|
||||
Understanding how an offender reacts psychologically to law enforcement and incarceration
|
||||
Testing the efficacy of treatment programs[1]
|
||||
The use of testimonies made by children
|
||||
How influenced are children’s testimonies by external forces? (ie., coaching)
|
||||
These areas of legal interest are supported by general psychological research into,
|
||||
|
||||
The decision-making skills of adults, individually or in groups
|
||||
Human perceptions and memory under stress
|
||||
Recollection of memories over time
|
||||
Peer pressure, group dynamics, and community expectations
|
||||
Adult psychology
|
||||
Assessment of program quality and post-release behaviour
|
||||
Developmental psychology
|
||||
The connection between the original psychology research and its use in the justice system is important to remember lest experts develop tunnel vision. For instance, to understand eyewitness memory, a psychologist should be concerned with memory processes as a whole, instead of only the aspects relevant to the law (e.g., lineups, accuracy of testimony). To understand false confessions, a psychologist should be familiar with research on decision making, compliance, obedience, persuasion, and other forms of social influence.
|
||||
For a time, legal psychology researchers were primarily focused on issues related to eyewitness testimony and jury decision-making—so much so that the editor of Law and Human Behavior, a leading legal psychology journal, implored researchers to expand the scope of their research and move on to other areas.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Legal psychology journals and associations ===
|
||||
There are several legal psychology journals, including Law and Human Behavior, Psychology, Public Policy and Law, Psychology, Crime & Law, and Journal of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law that focus on general topics of criminology, and the criminal justice system. In addition, research by legal psychologists is regularly published in more general journals that cover both basic and applied research areas. The Online Jury Research Update (OJRU) regularly summarizes legal psychology research about legal persuasion, jury research and trial advocacy.
|
||||
35
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_psychology-1.md
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35
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@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Legal psychology"
|
||||
chunk: 2/3
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_psychology"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:25.069000+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
== Roles of a legal psychologist ==
|
||||
|
||||
=== Academics and research ===
|
||||
Many legal psychologists work as professors in university psychology departments, criminal justice departments or law schools. Like other professors, legal psychologists generally conduct and publish empirical research, teach various classes, and mentor graduate and undergraduate students. Many legal psychologists also conduct research in a more general area of psychology (e.g., social, clinical, cognitive) with only a tangential legal focus. Those legal psychologists who work in law schools almost always hold a JD in addition to a PhD.
|
||||
Academics and researchers make up a significant amount of the psychologists involved today with applying psychology to legal contexts. While many think of clinical psychology as the main form of psychology in the law, however the utility of psychology, including applications of social, developmental, and neurological psychology has given significant amount of evidence-based methods to support a fair, proper, and humane justice system.
|
||||
The application of psychological knowledge and principles of evidence-based care are significant to maintaining fairness and integrity across the criminal justice system.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Amicus briefs ===
|
||||
One method that psychologists and researchers use to provide best practices to the justice system is through amicus briefs (defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as “a legal document supplied to a court of law containing advice or information relating to a case from a person or organization that is not directly involved in the case”. Psychologists can provide an amicus brief to the court. The amicus brief usually contains an opinion backed by scientific citations and statistics. The American Psychological Association has provided briefs concerning mental illness, intellectual or physical disability, and other factors. The rise in qualitative research methods has allowed these briefs to be more detailed with thorough explanations, compared to many of the older briefs which are based completely on statistics.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Advisory roles ===
|
||||
Legal psychologists may hold advisory roles in court systems. They may advise legal decision makers, particularly judges, on psychological findings pertaining to issues in a case. The psychologist who acts as a court adviser provides similar input to one acting as an expert witness, but acts out of the domain of an adversarial system.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Juror selection ===
|
||||
Juror selection is an area in which legal psychology is often used. Lawyers might use evidence-based methods of questioning, or might hire psychologists to review the jurors themselves. Psychologists working as consultants work on all stages of a case from helping to organize testimony, preparing witnesses to testify, picking juries, and even arranging "shadow jurors" to watch the trial unfold and provide input on the trial.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Policy making and legislative guidance ===
|
||||
Psychologists employed at public policy centers may attempt to influence legislative policy or may be called upon by state (or national) lawmakers to address some policy issue through empirical research. A psychologist working in public policy might suggest laws or help to evaluate a new legal practice (e.g., eyewitness lineups).
|
||||
|
||||
=== Expert witnesses ===
|
||||
|
||||
Psychologists are often called to be expert witnesses in the courtroom. They lend their professional perspective on the case, the validity of specific evidence, or the psychological state of an accused. Psychologists first entered the courtroom as clinicians to assist the court in determining the mental fitness of an accused. The process to ascertain whether they are capable of understanding the situation they are in, the questions being asked, and the consequences of the trial.[2] This information can only be assessed by a trained and experienced clinical psychologist and is necessary to determine if someone is ‘mentally fit’ to stand trial. This area, however, is typically covered under the area of clinical forensic psychology.
|
||||
However, outside of the clinical realm, psychologists specifically trained in legal issues, as well as those with no formal training, are often called by legal parties to testify as expert witnesses. In criminal trials, an expert witness may be called to testify about eyewitness memory, mistaken identity, competence to stand trial, the propensity of a death-qualified jury to also be "pro-guilt", etc. Psychologists who focus on clinical issues often testify specifically about a defendant's competence, intelligence, etc. More general testimony about perceptual issues (e.g., adequacy of police sirens) may also come up in trial.
|
||||
Experts, particularly psychology experts, are often accused of being "hired guns” who will testify to support their ‘side’. While it is possible that this happens, it is against the ethics code and standard of providing honest testimony. It can be problematic if both sides have psychological witnesses, jurors may have the daunting task of assessing difficult scientific information.
|
||||
Clinicians and researchers in psychology also provide testimony to support or refute evidence based on their experience. There are a range of topics which psychology has relevant research to contribute. The validity of eyewitness testimony is a prime example as legal psychologists have played significant roles in the understanding of the validity and reliability of eyewitness testimony as an investigative tool. Legal psychologists have also aided significantly in the creation of new knowledge and tools to combat the weaknesses of eyewitness recollection.
|
||||
30
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_psychology-2.md
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30
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_psychology-2.md
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@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Legal psychology"
|
||||
chunk: 3/3
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_psychology"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:25.069000+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
== Example of legal psychology in action ==
|
||||
One of the earliest experiments on eyewitness reliability was conducted in March 1893 J. McKeen Cattell posted questions to fifty-six of his students at Columbia University. The questions he asked his students were comparable to those asked in a court of justice. What he found was that it was reasonable to conclude eyewitness accounts of events were unreliable. His students were all sure they were mostly correct, even when they were not, and some were hesitant when they were in fact correct. He could not figure out specifically why each student had inaccurate testimonies.
|
||||
Research into eyewitness testimony became more popular nearly a century later in the 1980s and 1990s. As some research emerged about the potential unreliability of eyewitness memory concerns rose given the prevalent use of eyewitnesses for key evidence. Many details of crimes are obtained by interviewing witnesses, some of whom might testify in court, providing their account of the event into official evidence. Eyewitness testimony and identification of an accused is often a salient piece of evidence which unduly influences the opinions of the jury. As a result, incorrect or false eyewitness testimony has been found to be one of the most significant influences in the decision-making process among jurors. The combination of unreliable eyewitness recall and high regard of eyewitness testimony has led to the unjust convictions of many innocent people.[3]
|
||||
As a result of these findings, legal psychology researchers committed to creating and sharing evidence-based methods to promote best practices and lower the risk of a false eyewitness statement. In 1998, Wells et al., published an article of guidelines on the best methods collecting and using eyewitness testimony while protecting the integrity of the criminal justice system. In 2020, Wells et al., provided a much-needed update to these guidelines. This was done under the recommendation of the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41). In the 20 years since its first publishing there has been significant research on this topic of eyewitness identification procedures.
|
||||
The results yielded nine recommendations for planning, designing, and conducting eyewitness identification procedures. While four of the recommendations from the 1998 article were confirmed to be still be valid, there were an additional five recommendations added. Ultimately Wells et al., (2020), determined that “the reliability and integrity of eyewitness identification evidence is highly dependent on the procedures used by law enforcement for collecting and preserving the eyewitness evidence” (pg 1).
|
||||
These findings reinforce the need for research to be ongoing, critical, and applied to all sectors of the criminal justice system. As more research in an area is published the strength and utility of procedures and outcomes is able to be re-evaluated to allow for continual improvements to the criminal justice system.
|
||||
|
||||
== See also ==
|
||||
Applied psychology
|
||||
Empirical legal studies
|
||||
Forensic psychology
|
||||
Investigative psychology
|
||||
Police psychology
|
||||
List of United States Supreme Court cases involving mental health
|
||||
Therapeutic jurisprudence
|
||||
|
||||
== References ==
|
||||
|
||||
== External links ==
|
||||
American Psychology–Law Society
|
||||
57
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Kopelman-0.md
Normal file
57
data/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Kopelman-0.md
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "Michael Kopelman"
|
||||
chunk: 1/1
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Kopelman"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:23.840629+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Michael David Kopelman (born February 8, 1950) is a British researcher of memory disorders, having contributed for more than 30 years to the development of cognitive neuropsychology and cognitive neuropsychiatry. Until his retirement in 2015, he was lead clinician at the Neuropsychiatry and Memory Disorders Clinic at St Thomas' National Health Service teaching hospital in Central London. Beginning in 1981, he also served as an expert witness in legal proceedings, including high-profile cases.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== Education ==
|
||||
Kopelman's first degree was in psychology. He subsequently studied medicine at Middlesex University, and in 1978 completed his medical degree at the University of London. From 1980 to 1988, Kopelman trained in psychiatry at Bethlem-Maudsley Joint Hospitals. In 1988, he earned his PhD from the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== Research and career ==
|
||||
Kopelman's research interests include neurological memory disorders, especially retrograde amnesia; confabulation; executive function; semantic dementia; and psychogenic amnesia, particularly the nature of amnesia for offences.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=== Academic career ===
|
||||
From 1989 to 2015, Kopelman was first a consultant neuropsychiatrist, then professor of neuropsychiatry at Guy's, King's and St Thomas' School of Medicine. He is Emeritus Professor of Neuropsychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience, King's College London.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=== Professional associations ===
|
||||
In 2008, Kopelman was elected a Fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences. He is also a member of the British Psychological Society and Royal College of Psychiatrists. He is past president of the following organizations.
|
||||
|
||||
British Academy of Forensic Sciences
|
||||
British Neuropsychological Society (2004–2006)
|
||||
International Neuropsychiatric Association
|
||||
International Neuropsychoanalysis Society and
|
||||
International Neuropsychological Society
|
||||
Kopelman is a founding member of both the Memory Disorders Research Society and the Society of Expert Witnesses.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=== Expert witness ===
|
||||
Since 1981, Kopelman has served as an expert witness on neuropsychiatric and general psychiatric matters. He coauthored a Royal College of Psychiatrists report to the House of Lords before they declared detention orders unlawful in December 2004, and a confidential report to the governmental mediation hearings on Guantanamo returnees in 2010.
|
||||
According to the British Journal of Psychology, Kopelman has often been involved in "headline-grabbing courtroom dramas." His participation in high-profile cases includes criminal court, Appeal Court, Special Immigration Appeals Commission, death row, and extradition proceedings.
|
||||
In 2020, Kopelman served as a defence expert on behalf of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange at his first extradition hearing. Delivering her verdict in January 2021, district judge Vanessa Baraitser ruled that Assange could not be extradited from the UK to the U.S. because of fragile mental health and risk of suicide. The judgment quoted Kopelman, who evaluated Assange in HM Prison Belmarsh in 2019 and 2020: "I am as confident as a psychiatrist ever can be that, if extradition to the United States were to become imminent, Mr. Assange will find a way of suiciding." During the hearing, prosecution lawyers questioned Kopelman's impartiality as an expert witness, asserting he had failed in his duty by deliberately concealing the information that, during his time at the Ecuadorian embassy, Assange had formed a long-term relationship with Stella Morris and fathered two children with her. However, in her ruling the judge did not accept that Kopelman failed in his duty. "Professor Kopelman's decision to conceal their relationship was misleading and inappropriate in the context of his obligations to the court," Baraitser wrote, "but an understandable human response to Ms. Morris's predicament." Baraitser accepted that the court was at no point actually misled, explaining that the court had become aware of the relationship in April 2020, before reading Kopelman’s report, or hearing evidence on the issue. The judge ordered Assange released.
|
||||
Nevertheless, Assange remained in custody as the U.S. appealed to England's High Court of Justice, where in an August 2021 preliminary decision, Lord Justice Holroyde found that the district judge may have given too much weight to what Holroyde deemed "a misleading report" by Kopelman. Holroyde called it unusual for an appellate court to reassess expert witness evidence accepted by a lower court, but said it was arguable that the High Court might eventually reach a different conclusion, given that Kopelman had omitted to disclose what he knew about Assange's relationship with Stella Moris. The High Court was expected to convene a full hearing in October 2021.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=== Publications ===
|
||||
Kopelman has authored nearly 200 scientific articles.
|
||||
His books include:
|
||||
|
||||
The Handbook of Memory Disorders (coeditor; 2002)
|
||||
Forensic Neuropsychology in Practice: A guide to assessment and legal processes (coeditor; 2009)
|
||||
Lishman's Organic Psychiatry: A Textbook of Neuropsychiatry, 4th Edition (coauthor; 2012)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
=== Awards ===
|
||||
Kopelman received the 2013 Distinguished Career Award from the International Neuropsychological Society for his contributions to neuropsychology. The commendation recognized his "human rights medico-legal work on behalf of detainees and Guantanamo returnees."
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== References ==
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: "National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology and the Law"
|
||||
chunk: 1/1
|
||||
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Clearinghouse_for_Science,_Technology_and_the_Law"
|
||||
category: "reference"
|
||||
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
|
||||
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:27:27.710402+00:00"
|
||||
instance: "kb-cron"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology and the Law at Stetson University College of Law is an organization that provides information sharing and professional development to forensic scientists, lawyers, judges, other legal professionals, law enforcement personnel, educators, and the general public. Sponsored by a grant from the National Institute of Justice, NCSTL offers educational programs and a database of forensic-related information. Within the context of the promotion of justice based on sound science and technology, NCSTL focuses on raising awareness and fostering communication and understanding among the various parties interested in scientific evidence and expert testimony.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== Free Forensics Database ==
|
||||
One of the primary purposes of NCSTL is to provide a resource that collects and tracks the latest available sources related to forensics and technology. NCSTL scrutinizes and disseminates useful information in the form of a research database on the Internet that is free and available to the public.
|
||||
The NCSTL database was first offered live to the public in February 2005. It collects and distributes bibliographic information on thousands of court decisions, pieces of legislation, legal and scientific publications, news and media features, websites and educational opportunities. Using the database, researchers can choose to view all types of resources in all its forensic-related topics, or restrict to those topics or resource types of specific interest. Individual records provide bibliographic information, as well as active URLs that link to full text whenever available. Researchers can also take advantage of a feature that offers the ability to save favorite searches. Materials found in the database are supported in hard copy in the NCSTL collection in Stetson Law Library.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== Educational Resources ==
|
||||
In its continuing education efforts, NCSTL tries to raise awareness of the nature of good evidence practices. NCSTL presents an annual lecture series on the Stetson Law School campus that has included presentations by noted forensic scientists such as Drs. Michael Baden and Henry Lee about a wide variety of forensic topics, including forensic investigations. Thus, through its continuing education efforts, NCSTL shares with the forensic science community and the public what good forensic science practices are. NCSTL’s lecture series is not only free and open to the public, but is webcast and podcast live, as well as available archivally from the NCSTL website. NCSTL is also developing continuing education programs for forensic scientists and attorneys.
|
||||
NCSTL also offers educational opportunities to students. As a program at Stetson University College of Law, students can earn academic or pro bono credit by helping build the NCSTL database. In addition, students at other universities are welcome to volunteer, and may be able to arrange earning credit at their own educational institutions.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
== External links ==
|
||||
National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology and the Law - official site
|
||||
Diana Botluk, The National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology and the Law: Supporting the Role of Forensic Science in the Administration of Justice, 36 Stetson L. Rev. 609 (Spring 2007)
|
||||
Forensics Has a New Website, 1 The Forensic Teacher 16 (Fall 2006)
|
||||
Rebecca Kanable, The National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology and the Law: A One-Stop Shop for Science, Technology and Law Information, Law Enforcement Technology (Oct. 2006)
|
||||
Science, Technology, and the Law, TechBeat (Spring 2006)
|
||||
Diana Botluk & Brittan Mitchell, Getting a Grip on the CSI Effect: The National Clearinghouse for Science, Technology and the Law at Stetson University, LLRX (May 15, 2005)
|
||||
Kit R. Roane, The CSI Effect: On TV, It's All Slam-Dunk Evidence and Quick Convictions, U.S. News & World Report (Apr. 17, 2005)
|
||||
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Neurolaw is a field of interdisciplinary study that explores the effects of discoveries in neuroscience on legal rules and standards. Drawing from neuroscience, philosophy, social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and criminology, neurolaw practitioners seek to address not only the descriptive and predictive issues of how neuroscience is and will be used in the legal system, but also the normative issues of how neuroscience should and should not be used.
|
||||
The rapid growth of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) research has led to new insights on neuroanatomical structure and function, which has led to a greater understanding of human behavior and cognition. As a response, there has been an emergence of questions regarding how these findings can be applied to criminology and legal processes. Major areas of current neurolaw research include courtroom applications, legal implications of neuroscience findings, and how neuroscience-related jurisdiction can be created and applied.
|
||||
Despite the growing interest in neurolaw and its potential applications, the legal realm recognizes the substantial opportunity for misuse and is proceeding cautiously with novel research outcomes.
|
||||
|
||||
== History ==
|
||||
The term neurolaw was first coined by J. Sherrod Taylor in 1991, in a Neuropsychology journal article analyzing the role of psychologists and lawyers in the criminal justice system. After this publication, scholars from both fields began to network through presentations and dialogs, and start to publish books, articles, and other literature about this intersection. Parallel to the expansion of neurolaw, an emergence of neuroethics was developing.
|
||||
The intersection of neurolaw and ethics was able to be better scrutinized by the initiation of the Law and Neuroscience Project by The MacArthur Foundation. Phase I of this project was launched in 2007 with a $10 million grant. The initiative sustained forty projects addressing a multitude of issues, including experimental and theoretical data that will provide further evidence as to how neuroscience may eventually shape the law. The Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research and the Dana Foundation are some of the prominent institutions that receive grants and conduct neurolaw research under this initiative.
|
||||
Neurolaw has also piqued the interests of several universities, such as Baylor College of Medicine's Initiative on Neuroscience and the Law, now known as the national nonprofit, called the Center for Science & Law. SciLaw, as the organization is known, seeks to leverage neuroscience, law, ethics, programming, and data science to analyze policies and develop solutions to advance the criminal justice system. Their stated goal is to 'steer social policy in an evidenced-based manner, thereby reducing rates of incarceration and providing innovative options for improving the criminal justice system in a cost effective and humane way'. The University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Neuroscience and Society began in July 2009, and is working towards confronting the social, legal, and ethical inferences of neuroscience. Vanderbilt University created the first dual J.D./PhD in the United States in 2010.
|
||||
|
||||
== Neurocriminology ==
|
||||
A few important sources have shaped the way that neuroscience is currently used in the courtroom. Primarily, J. Sherrod Taylor's book, Neurolaw: Brain and Spinal Cord Injury (1997), which was used as a resource for attorneys to properly introduce medical jargon into the courtroom and to further develop the implications of neuroscience on litigation. In this book, Taylor also explained the consequences of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. This United States Supreme Court case resulted in what is now known as Daubert Standard, which sets rules regarding the use of scientific evidence in the courtroom. This standard governs the way that neuroscience evidence can be presented during a court case.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Criminal perception ===
|
||||
Recently, Petoft and his colleagues introduced a newly coined term: "Criminal perception" "as an ability that makes it possible for a child to understand criminal situations and behave lawfully." The term encompasses two distinct intertwined characteristics of children mean Social and Moral Personalities. The former employs the areas of the brain which contribute to normative cognition and person perception; and the latter stems from the cognitive networks by which gut feeling, emotional awareness, and conscious deliberation are realized in a criminal situation.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Crime prediction ===
|
||||
Behavioral testing and neuroimaging evidence offer potentially more accurate modalities for predicting human behavior. Developing these tools to be used in criminology would be beneficial particularly in determining criminal sentence length and in assessing risk for which criminals should remain in jail or be released based on prediction of future offenses. Not only could the adaptation of these tools aid in the process of recidivism, but they could also show indications for the need for personal rehabilitation. In light of this information and its potential applications, the legal system seeks to create a balance between punishment and penalties based on the ability to predict additional criminal activity.
|
||||
The Center for Science & Law has developed a suite of mobile and gamified NeuroCognitive Risk Assessments (NCRA) to help steer people to the proper post-conviction rehabilitation programs by harnessing what drives individual decision making. By understanding individual differences in aggression, empathy, decision making, and impulsivity -- without reference to race -- the group states they can build better and fairer inroads to rehabilitation. As a risk assessment, it was found to be as predictive or more so than risk assessments commonly used. Holding consistent with their mission to "advance justice", the NCRA does not collect race data making for a more fair and unbiased assessment.
|
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|
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|
||||
=== Insanity defense ===
|
||||
The tendency of the United States criminal justice system has been to limit the degree to which one can claim innocence based on mental illness. During the middle of the 20th century many courts, through the Durham Rules and the American Law Institute Model Penal Code, regarded impaired volition as legitimate grounds for the insanity defense. However, when John Hinckley was acquitted due to insanity in 1982, a reversal of this opinion occurred, which spurred a narrowing definition of mental illness. Insanity decisions became increasingly based on the M’Naghten Rules, which asserted that unless one was able to prove that a mental illness kept him or her from knowing that their actions were wrong, or knowing the disposition of the criminal act, one would not be able to be tried as criminally insane.
|
||||
Contemporary research conducted on the prefrontal cortex has criticized this standpoint because it considers impaired volition as a factor. Many researchers and courts are beginning to consider "irresistible impulse" as legitimate grounds for mental illness. One of the factors neurosciences have added to the insanity defense is the claim that the brain “made someone do it.” In these cases, the argument is based on the notion that individuals' decisions are made for them, before they are able to consciously realize what they are doing.
|
||||
Further research on control and inhibition mechanisms will allow for further modifications to the insanity defense. Impaired functioning of the PFC is evidence that a prime factor in mental illness is disrupted volition. Many experiments using fMRI show that one of the functions of the PFC is to bias a person towards taking the more difficult action. This action is representative of a long-term reward, and it is competing with an action that will lead to immediate satisfaction. It is responsible for moral reasoning, including regret. Individual variations that impair the PFC are extremely detrimental to the decision-making process and give an individual a greater likelihood in a committing a crime he or she would have otherwise not committed.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Brain death ===
|
||||
Injuries or illnesses that lead to a persistent vegetative state have come to the forefront of many ethical, legal, and scientific issues regarding brain death. From the exterior, it is a difficult to know when a patient is beyond hope for recovery, as well as to decide who has the right to end life support.
|
||||
Research initiatives in cognition have helped to develop an understanding of the vegetative state. Research has shown that although a person can be awake and conscious, he or she may not show any signs of awareness or recognition to external stimulation. In 2005, research was conducted on a 23-year-old female who suffered traumatic brain injury from an automobile accident. The woman was declared to be in a vegetative state; after five months she continued to be unresponsive, but brain pattern measurements indicated normal sleep and wake cycles. Using fMRI technology, researchers concluded that she was able to understand external stimuli via activity in specific regions of the brain. Particularly, she exhibited increased activity in the middle and superior temporal gyri similar to the way that a healthy individual would. This positive response revealed potential for medical imaging to be used to understand the implications of brain death, and to help answer legal, scientific, and ethical questions pertaining to individuals in vegetative states.
|
||||
|
||||
== Nootropics ==
|
||||
Neurolaw also encompasses ethical questions regarding nootropics, or mind-enhancing drugs. Current research suggests that the future may hold powerful medications that can specifically target and alter brain function by bypassing the blood brain barrier. The potential to significantly improve one's concentration, memory, or cognition through drug-use has raised numerous questions on the legality of these substances, and their appropriateness in everyday life. Analogous to the controversy over the use of anabolic steroids in professional sports, many high schools and universities are wary of students eventually using nootropics to artificially boost academic performance.
|
||||
Some of the questions raised regarding the use of nootropics include:
|
||||
|
||||
How will these enhancers affect performance gaps between family income classes?
|
||||
Will it become necessary to use an enhancing drug simply to remain competitive in society?
|
||||
How does society distinguish between what is an acceptable substance (e.g., caffeine) and an unacceptable substance to alter one's mind?
|
||||
Do people have the right to experiment with substances to modify their own cognition?
|
||||
Scientists and ethicists have attempted to answer these questions while analyzing the overall effect on society. For example, it is largely accepted that mind-enhancing drugs are acceptable for use on patients diagnosed with cognitive disorders, as in a case of prescribing Adderall to children and adults with ADHD. However, Adderall and Ritalin have also become popular black-market drugs, most notably on college campuses. Students often use them to maintain focus when struggling to complete large amounts of schoolwork, and often become dependent on the effects produced.
|
||||
It is ethically debatable whether individuals who do not need nootropics should use them, and mostly unknown how continued usage could impact the brain chemistry of someone who is using nootropics for nonprescriptive reasons.
|
||||
|
||||
== Current research ==
|
||||
Neurolaw advancements depend on state-of-the-art medical technology and grant-funded research. Among the most prominent technologies and disciplines used in neurolaw research are functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography (PET scan), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and epigenetics.
|
||||
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|
||||
|
||||
=== Epigenetics ===
|
||||
Current research is exploring how genetic analysis can be used to assess risk and predict atypical behaviors. Studies have shown links between violent behaviors and a low allele variant of the MAOA gene. Preliminary research suggests that males that have this dysfunctional gene and have experienced childhood abuse are several hundred times more likely to commit a violent crime than those with normal MAOA gene expression.
|
||||
Findings like this have sparked a conversation about 'neuroprediction' or using genetics and neuroimaging modalities to predict criminal behavior and assess individual risk. If the science behind prediction improves, lawmakers will need to decide the role that genetic, neuroanatomical, or neuropathic predictions can play in legal decisions for risk assessment, particularly when a criminal is being sentenced or released.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Neuroimaging ===
|
||||
Understanding structural and mechanistic neural dysfunction in criminals can help to determine motives and define criminal responsibility.
|
||||
fMRI is particularly important because it allows for detailed functional mapping of the human brain. fMRI measures blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast, which allows us to view the most active areas of the brain at a given moment based on blood flow. This imaging modality allows researchers to identify and understand complex neural pathways and mechanisms. Relevant mechanisms in neurolaw research are memory, reward, impulse, and deceit circuitry.
|
||||
Neuroimaging modalities can also be used to analyze neuroanatomical structures in terms of size and shape. Researchers are working towards defining the characteristics of healthy, well-functioning brain structures, which may help us better understand the dysfunctions and deficits in atypical, criminal brains.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Lie detection ===
|
||||
|
||||
There is potential to use fMRI evidence as a more advanced form of lie detection, particularly in identifying the regions of the brain involved in truth telling, deception, and false memories.
|
||||
False memories are a barrier in validating witness testimonies. Research has shown that when presented a list of semantically related words, participant recollection can often be unintentionally false and additive of words that were not originally present. This is a normal psychological occurrence but presents numerous problems to a jury when attempting to sort out the facts of a case.
|
||||
fMRI imaging is also being used to analyze brain activity during intentional lies. Findings have shown that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activates when subjects are pretending to know information, but that the right anterior hippocampus activates when a subject presents false recognition in contrast to lying or accurately telling a truth. This indicates that there may be two separate neural pathways for lying and false memory recall. However, there are limitations to how much brain imaging can distinguish between truths and deceptions because these regions are common areas of executive control function; It is difficult to tell if the activation seen is due to the lie told, or something unrelated.
|
||||
Future research aims to differentiate between when someone has genuinely forgotten an experience and when someone has made an active choice to withhold or fabricate information. Developing this distinction to the point of scientific validity would help discern when defendants are being truthful about their actions and when witnesses are being truthful about their experiences.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Neuroimaging criticisms ===
|
||||
The use of neuroimaging in the legal system creates a very divided audience. Many argue for its potential, while others argue it will not accurately replace human investigation of criminal decision-making processes.
|
||||
Even considering recent research findings, neuroimaging is still inadequately understood. Additional medical factors like age, medication history, diet, and endocrine function need to be considered when viewing an fMRI image, and the sensitivity of the scanner needs to be considered as well. If the person being scanned is moving or inaccurately completing assigned tasks, the images produced will be invalid. Other critics highlight that the image derived from the technology does not display the brain's intentionality. Functional neuroimaging was not intended to calculate volition, and while it may offer insight into the processes that cause behavior, it is debated whether or not the images can objectively narrow in on human reasoning and specific thought processes. These factors make neuroimaging results hard to assess precisely, which is why there is hesitation towards presenting them in court cases.
|
||||
Controversy over the science behind fMRI lie detection entered a federal courtroom in 2010 with a Daubert hearing concerning its admissibility in a criminal trial. Ultimately, the images were excluded based on doubts about neuroimaging validity. A 2012 appeal of the case failed to change the court's view of the matter. Legal professionals suggest that there are currently too many serious, open questions about the suitability of neuroimaging for legal or other high stakes uses.
|
||||
|
||||
== Biophysical Sovereignty ==
|
||||
In the context of the legal and ethical implications of neuroscience, the concept of Biophysical Sovereignty emerged in 2026 as a framework to ensure individual ownership over the body's mechanosensory interfaces. This principle asserts that the operational use of ion channels, specifically PIEZO1 and PIEZO2, should remain in the Public domain.
|
||||
Through the establishment of Prior art in open-access repositories, this framework technically enables the mechanical activation of biological hardware while preventing its commercial appropriation. By detailing specific parameters for percussive mechanotransduction and sustained pressure, these protocols ensure that the regulation of cognitive and systemic states remains an inalienable right, aligned with the UNESCO 2026 guidelines on Neuro-rights.
|
||||
|
||||
== Application in practice ==
|
||||
Neurolaw techniques and policies are slowly entering the legal system due to professional and general public skepticism about its validity. Currently two companies, No Lie MRI and Cephos Corp, offer lie-detection services that utilize neuroimaging. Their services are considered to be a more advanced form of a polygraph test but are rarely accepted as evidence in the courtroom. Use of neuroimaging evidence for structural and functional analysis varies greatly by geographic region and cultural acceptance of the modality.
|
||||
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||||
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|
||||
|
||||
=== Criminal law ===
|
||||
In the United States, brain scan results have been increasingly utilized during the sentencing phase of trials, with the rate of cases involving neuroscience evidence doubling from 2006 to 2009. In two instances occurring in California and New York, defendants were able to reduce their sentence of first-degree murder to manslaughter using neuroimaging. Each case presented brain scans suggesting hindered neurological function hoping to mitigate their responsibility in the crime. Brain images were also used in the case of Harrington v. State of Iowa in 2003 as evidence for the defense. However, in the case of Harrington v. State of Iowa, the brain images were solely shown to the judge and not a jury panel, reducing the ability of this case to be used as precedent for utilizing brain imaging as evidence.
|
||||
In Mumbai, India, the legal system has taken a more rapid approach in applying neuroscience and has already incorporated it into criminal convictions. In 2008, an Indian woman was convicted of murder based on strong circumstantial evidence, including a brain scan that suggested her guilt. This conviction was sharply criticized by Hank Greely, a professor of law at Stanford University. Greely contested the scan based on evidence produced by a Brain Electrical Oscillation Signature Profiling test (BEOSP). No scientific peer-review studies had ever been published demonstrating the efficacy of BEOSP, raising questions about its reliability in such an important decision.
|
||||
|
||||
=== Government and military ===
|
||||
The United States Military has become increasingly interested in the possibilities of neuroscience research. Brain imaging could help to distinguish between enemy combatants from those who pose no risk or determine the mental stability of their own soldiers. Nootropic drugs could also be used to enhance the focus and memories of soldiers, allowing for better recognition of dangers and improved performance. However, this has led to questions regarding the personal privacy of soldiers and detainees, and the compliance requirements that may come with performance enhancement. Although the civilian court system is reluctant to use unproven technologies, the military's future use of them may generate controversy over the possible innocence or guilt of enemy combatants.
|
||||
With the advent of novel technological innovations and information in the field of neuroscience, the military has begun to anticipate specific uses for such neuroscience research. However, these approaches, which can alter human cognitive abilities as well as infringe on an individual's right to the privacy of his or her own thoughts, are still innovatory and early in development. Present day treaties, such as the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the Chemical Weapons Conventions, address only the use of certain chemical agents and are not regulating the fast-paced evolution of recent advancements in cognitive science research. Due to this ambiguity and the potential of technology misuse, it has become increasingly pressing to address the regulations and ethics needed for neuroscience research.
|
||||
Another area of interest to the military is the use of human enhancement drugs. DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), a Pentagon branch of the United States Department of Defense, is responsible for significant amount of military research and development of technology. With the announcement of the BRAIN Initiative in 2013, DARPA began to support this initiative through a number of programs involving under-researched neuroscience topics like neuromodulation, proprioception, and neurotechnology. A current operation of DARPA is named the Preventing Sleep Deprivation Program, which conducts research on the molecular processes and changes in the brain involved with sleep deprivation, with the ultimate purpose to maximize warfighters’ cognitive abilities, even with sleep deprivation. As a result of this research, sleep deprivation prevention drugs such as Modafinil and Ampakine CX717 have increased in significance. However, because these chemical drugs directly affect natural chemical reactions and receptors in the body, the ethics of their use as well as safety are in question.
|
||||
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|
||||
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||||
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|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
== Cautions and concerns ==
|
||||
Public opinion of neurolaw is influenced by cultural, political, and media-related factors. Surveys show that the general public does not have a well-formed understanding of neurolaw. Approval seems to depend highly on how the topic is framed and may even vary depending on partisanship. Due to glorified depictions of forensics labs on popular television shows, brain imaging has faced criticism for having a "CSI effect". It is possible that some people have a false understanding of forensic science based on inaccurate portrayals. This could lead to them having a stronger opinion about technological evidence or neurolaw initiatives.
|
||||
Neuroscience is still not fully understood. There is not enough evidence of structural and functional relationships to be able to confidently link a brain feature to a criminal behavior or issue. This uncertainty leaves room for misuse of neuroscientific evidence in a courtroom. American professor of law and psychology Stephen J. Morse described the abuse of neuroscience in courtrooms with a pseudo-disease he called "brain overclaim syndrome". He comments on the idea of people having diminished responsibility or no responsibility for their actions because those actions were caused by "the brain", in situations where the science could not support such causal claims. He raises the question of whether brains should be blamed for crimes, or the people behind them.
|
||||
Lawmakers and judges are cautious due to the lack of concrete findings in neurolaw. Before making decisions on how to regulate and utilize neuroscience research in court, lawmakers and judges must consider the implications that will come with suggested changes. Neuroimaging and genetic evidence have the potential to be helpful in legal processes and ensure that dangerous criminals stay behind bars, but it also has the potential to be abused in a way that imprisons undeserving parties on purpose or due to negligent use of the science.
|
||||
Although some experts recognize the possibilities and drawbacks of brain imaging, others still completely reject the field. In the future, judges must decide on the relevance and validity of neurological evidence so that it can enter the courtroom, and juries must be open to understanding scientific concepts but not be too willing to place all faith in neuroscience.
|
||||
|
||||
== See also ==
|
||||
Cognitive liberty
|
||||
|
||||
== References ==
|
||||
|
||||
== Further reading ==
|
||||
Eagleman, David (2011). "The Brain on Trial". No. July/August. The Atlantic.
|
||||
The Lavin Agency Speakers Bureau. "Neuroscience and the Legal System: David Eagleman". YouTube. Archived from the original on 2021-12-15.
|
||||
The RSA. "David Eagleman - The Brain and The Law". YouTube. Archived from the original on 2021-12-15.
|
||||
Ienca, Marcello, & Roberto Andorno (2017). "Towards New Human Rights in the Age of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology". Life Sciences, Society and Policy. Vol. 13, no. 5. doi:10.1186/s40504-017-0050-1.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
|
||||
Petoft, Arian (2015). "Neurolaw: a brief introduction". Iranian Journal of Neurology. Archived from the original on 2015-07-27. Retrieved 2015-01-07.
|
||||
Petoft, Arian (2015). "Toward Human Behavior Sciences from the Perspective of Neurolaw". International Journal of Public Mental Health and Neurosciences. Archived from the original on 2017-09-03. Retrieved 2015-03-27.
|
||||
Rosen, Jeffrey (2007-03-11). "The Brain on the Stand". New York Times Magazine. Retrieved 2011-03-22.
|
||||
Jones, Owen; et al. (2009). "Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed". Vol. 5. Stanford Technology Law Review. SSRN 1563612.
|
||||
Jones, Owen, & Francis X. Shen (2012). "Law and Neuroscience in the United States". International Neurolaw: A Comparative Analysis, p. 349, T.M. Spranger, ed. Springer-Verlag. SSRN 2001085.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
|
||||
Jones, Owen; et al. "Law and Neuroscience Casebook".
|
||||
"Law and Neuroscience Bibliography".
|
||||
Wagner, Anthony; et al. (2016). "fMRI and Lie Detection". MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience. SSRN 2881586.
|
||||
|
||||
== External links ==
|
||||
Center of Science and Law
|
||||
The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience homepage
|
||||
Law and Neuroscience at Vanderbilt
|
||||
Neurolaw: The Scales of Justice Archived 2007-04-27 at the Wayback Machine
|
||||
NPR: Jeffrey Rosen on 'Neurolaw' in the Courtroom
|
||||
Law and Neuroscience Email Listserv
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user