---
title: "Citicorp Center engineering crisis"
chunk: 4/4
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citicorp_Center_engineering_crisis"
category: "reference"
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:22:37.754740+00:00"
instance: "kb-cron"
---

Analysis of wind loads: Although quartering wind loads were considered early in the design process, LeMessurier initially reached the conclusion that they were not the critical case for the building's structural analysis, and came to rely primarily on the calculations for perpendicular winds, as required by building codes, rather than checking all calculations and scenarios thoroughly.
Design changes: The steel framework subcontractor (Bethlehem Steel) proposed to use bolted joints instead of full-penetration welding, and the proposal was approved by LeMessurier's firm without LeMessurier personally reviewing the details. Kremer reported that Robert McNamara, "the managing principal for Citicorp in LeMessurier Associates' Cambridge office", stated that after he reviewed the proposal, he "presented the suggested change to Bill LeMessurier", who "discussed [with him] the technical implications and did calculations as to what effect the bolt extension in the connection would have on the movement of the tower ...", and that LeMessurier's firm then approved the details of the change without LeMessurier personally reviewing those details. This somewhat contradicts LeMessurier, who said he wasn't aware of the substitution until after the work had been completed.
Professional responsibility: Before LeMessurier decided to make Citicorp aware of the design defects, he briefly considered concealing the issues instead, or even suicide. Kremer said he should not have entertained such thoughts, even briefly. In contrast, the AIA study reports that it is clear LeMessurier never really considered the other options seriously.
Public statements: In press interviews and releases of information at the time, officials either omitted or lied about details of the defects. Kremer cites the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) Code of Ethics, which says engineers shall "Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner."
Public safety: When Hurricane Ella threatened the city in August and September 1978, evacuation plans for the surrounding area were made in secret. Kremer cites the NSPE Board of Ethical Review (BER), which, although it was not commenting about the Citicorp Center specifically, said "withholding critical information from thousands of individuals whose safety is compromised over a significant period of time" is improper (although it could be argued that the Citicorp Center situation did not rise to meet that standard, when considering that no storms with high winds actually occurred in New York City during the period in question, and other steps had been taken to reduce the risk, and evacuation plans were ready if a high-wind storm were to occur).
Advancing professional knowledge: Kremer argues that concealing the crisis for almost 20 years prevented some of the ethical and engineering analysis and learning that could have taken place if information had been released about the Citicorp Center case.

== References ==

== Sources ==
Morgenstern, Joseph (May 25, 1995). "The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis". The New Yorker. pp. 45–53. (accessible only once without a subscription)
Postal, Matthew A. (December 6, 2016). "Citicorp Center" (PDF). New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission.
Stern, Robert A. M.; Mellins, Thomas; Fishman, David (1995). New York 1960: Architecture and Urbanism Between the Second World War and the Bicentennial (1960 ed.). New York: Monacelli Press. ISBN 1-885254-02-4.

== External links ==
Veritasium: How a Student's Question Saved This NYC Skyscraper