---
title: "Hirohito"
chunk: 14/16
source: "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito"
category: "reference"
tags: "science, encyclopedia"
date_saved: "2026-05-05T04:06:28.660739+00:00"
instance: "kb-cron"
---

"The Emperor appears to have been prepared for war in the face of the tense times." (13 October 1941)
Likewise, Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, is quoted as saying:

"I occasionally have to try to stop him from going too far." (13 October 1941)
"The Emperor's resolve appears to be going too far." (20 November 1941)
"I requested the Emperor to say things to give the impression that Japan will exhaust all measures to pursue peace when the Foreign Minister is present." (20 November 1941)
Seiichi Chadani, professor of modern Japanese history with Shigakukan University who has studied Hirohito's actions before and during the war said on the discovery of Hyakutake's diary:

"The archives available so far, including his biography compiled by the Imperial Household Agency, contained no detailed descriptions that his aides expressed concerns about Hirohito leaning toward Japan's entry into the war."
"(Hyakutake's diary) is a significant record penned by one of the close aides to the Emperor documenting the process of how Japan's leaders led to the war."

==== Vice Interior Minister Yuzawa's account on Hirohito's role in Pearl Harbor raid ====
In late July 2018, the bookseller Takeo Hatano, an acquaintance of the descendants of Michio Yuzawa (Japanese Vice Interior Minister in 1941), released to Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper a memo by Yuzawa that Hatano had kept for nine years since he received it from Yuzawa's family. Hatano said: "It took me nine years to come forward, as I was afraid of a backlash. But now I hope the memo would help us figure out what really happened during the war, in which 3.1 million people were killed."
Takahisa Furukawa, expert on wartime history from Nihon University, confirmed the authenticity of the memo, calling it "the first look at the thinking of Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Hideki Tojo on the eve of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor." Although not definitive, the five-page document supports the perspective that Hirohito holds at least some responsibility for initiating the war.
In this document, Yuzawa details a conversation he had with Tojo a few hours before the attack. The Vice Minister quotes Tojo saying:

"The Emperor seemed at ease and unshakable once he had made a decision."
"If His Majesty had any regret over negotiations with Britain and the U.S., he would have looked somewhat grim. There was no such indication, which must be a result of his determination. I'm completely relieved. Given the current conditions, I could say we have practically won already."
Historian Furukawa concluded from Yuzawa's memo:

"Tojo is a bureaucrat who was incapable of making own decisions, so he turned to the Emperor as his supervisor. That's why he had to report everything for the Emperor to decide. If the Emperor didn't say no, then he would proceed."
Furukawa further added that the memo supported the view that Hirohito was less opposed to war with the United States than earlier portrayals have indicated. The memo confirmed that during a meeting on December 1, Hirohito approved the government’s decision to abandon diplomacy and maintained this position on the eve of the attack. Yuzawa’s account depicts Tojo as calm and optimistic after completing all the necessary administrative preparations for war. Most importantly, Tojo drew confidence from Hirohito’s final approval, given without any questions or objections.

==== Chief Military Aide-de-Camp Takeji Nara's diary ====
The diary of Japanese general Takeji Nara documented Nara's interactions with the emperor and described Hirohito's reactions to Japan's role in instigating the Mukden Incident. Nara's diary entries show that Hirohito was well aware of the Mukden Incident and acknowledged that Japanese General Kanji Ishiwara was its instigator. However, once the emperor justified that the army's actions in Manchuria as necessary, he gradually adapted to the new circumstances and showed little desire to punish those responsible.

=== Evidence against wartime culpability ===

==== British government assessment of Hirohito ====
The declassified January 1989 British government assessment of Hirohito describes him as "too weak to alter the course of events" and Hirohito was "powerless" and comparisons with Hitler are "ridiculously wide off the mark." Hirohito's power was limited by ministers and the military and if he asserted his views too much he would have been replaced by another member of the royal family.
The dispatch by John Whitehead, former ambassador of the United Kingdom to Japan, to Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe was declassified on Thursday 20 July 2017 at the National Archives in London. The letter was written shortly after Hirohito's death. Whitehead wrote that Hirohito was  "uneasy with Japan's drift to war in the 1930s and 1940s but was too weak to alter the course of events." Whitehead also wrote: